Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2014-11-25-Speech-2-647-000"
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"en.20141125.35.2-647-000"2
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"Mr President, may I extend a welcome to Commissioner Hill. I would like to begin by thanking Mr Johan Van Overtveldt for the excellent work he did in drafting this initial report before leaving Parliament to become Belgian Finance Minister. I have tried to continue working on this report using his methods and vision.
I would also like to thank the shadow rapporteurs from all the political groups for their cooperation on this report and, despite some of the differences on minor parts of the report, I hope this goodwill will extend to the overall report being voted through tomorrow.
In the last Parliament we made an unprecedented change to the role of the European Central Bank. Instead of just acting as a central bank with power over monetary policy, we gave it powers to supervise the largest banks in the eurozone, with the option for those Member States outside the eurozone to also join the single supervisory mechanism.
The Banking Union has fundamentally changed the role and responsibility of the ECB. While the ECB should continue to be independent from political influence in terms of monetary policy, it is imperative that in its new function as banking supervisor it is accountable. During earlier trialogues the Parliament tried to include scrutiny processes and transparency in the ECB’s operations and was often rebuffed, yet we did make some huge steps forward in terms of information-sharing with Parliament, so some democratic accountability is present within the process.
I have tried in this report to continue in this vein, adding accountability and transparency wherever possible. In the initial draft of this regulation, when the ECB imposed a sanction upon a financial institution it could decide whether or not this sanction was made public. There were no conditions or time limits attached. It was entirely within their mandate to decide on whether or not to disclose. While I can see reasons why, in some circumstances, not immediately publishing the fact that they have been sanctioned might be necessary, for example in the case of a wider financial crisis situation or, indeed, worries about bank runs, this should not be the norm. The normal operating procedure should be immediate public disclosure. The prospect of a fine may not faze large financial companies, but being on the front page of every newspaper poses a much larger reputational risk. For this reason we have a compromise between political groups to ensure a three-year time limit so that the ECB cannot wait any longer to disclose the fact that they have sanctioned a financial firm.
I am disappointed that there is one area that we have not been able to find a compromise on so far. I am a firm believer in the concept of innocent until proven guilty. Therefore, if we consider that part of the punishment for breaking the rules is that of reputational damage, using a ‘naming and shaming’ approach, then it seems to me logical that if a decision is subject to an appeal and may still be overturned, we should allow a longer time period before disclosure to the wider market. Failing to provide this safeguard may otherwise cause a bank to lose significant value in its share price based solely on accusations that are later overturned on appeal. I believe adding in this safeguard ensures the fairness of the disclosure process and will increase the effectiveness of the sanctioning regime, which will then increase the effectiveness of the ECB itself when exercising its supervisory powers.
I therefore hope that the majority of the European Parliament political groups can continue to support this centrist position calling for increased transparency. Specifically on the Gualtieri report I have little to add, because quality of regulation depends on quality of the statistics that the supervisors are working on. I honestly believe that the only way we get good quality supervision is good-quality data. Therefore I hope the proposals in these two reports are supported tomorrow."@en1
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