Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2014-01-15-Speech-3-551-000"

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"en.20140115.47.3-551-000"2
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"Mr President, following on from that speech, I have to say that, if there is a symbolic and practical aspect of the Parliament inquiry into mass surveillance that is appropriate for this week in Strasbourg, it must be Safe Harbour, because it affects EU citizens and their data and it affects the commercial and business aspects. That has become both a practical factor and a symbol of the problem that we have with EU data transfers and the problem that we have with trust between the European Union and the United States, and it has become symbolic of what we have to fix. Safe Harbour has in many respects become the symbol of what we have in this inquiry and the task that we have. So, in the European Parliament inquiry and my draft report drawn up with the help of the shadow rapporteurs, who are sitting here, and the working document from Axel Voss, all the hard work that has been performed over the last few months has led to the recommendation to suspend the Safe Harbour decision to allow for the transfer of EU citizens’ data and to ensure that we have another mechanism which reflects our higher standard of privacy and data protection in the EU. The idea that you have – I think Mr Weber put it very well – a first-class and second-class standard for citizens or for businesses is unacceptable. So what are we saying about Safe Harbour that is so symbolic and practical? First, we talk about the weaknesses and the lack of information available. We have seen in the inquiry clear evidence of non-compliant companies continuing to remain on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) website as being compliant, lack of enforcement procedures from the FTC, as well as no adequate complaint mechanisms in place to ensure redress for EU citizens and accountability of companies. That is the evidence that we have seen. Data collected from EU citizens is being transferred to the US with extremely weak safeguards in place and in the knowledge that the US has lower data protection standards that exist here in the EU. Safe Harbour, as it stands, does not offer EU citizens any protection against data access requests by the NSA under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) or the Patriot Act in the US, and we have to ask the Commission to consider the vast electronic surveillance carried out by the US as a breach of the present wording of Safe Harbour and limitations for national security. While the Commission has already recognised the serious inadequacies in relation to Safe Harbour, their 13 recommendations to the FTC in the US may not be enough. This procedure may lack any real enforceability, as it is void of any real obligations on the US to take these seriously. So in these last few seconds I would say to the Commission: you and we are speaking with one voice to Washington, but we must treat Safe Harbour as that symbolic and practical aspect of our inquiry that needs to be fixed with the United States in order to recreate trust with the United States and to ensure that our inquiry has real meaning in rebuilding the regulation of protection as something meaningful between us and the United States."@en1
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