Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2012-07-03-Speech-2-062-000"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20120703.5.2-062-000"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spoken text |
"Mr President, firstly let me also congratulate Spain on their great victory on Sunday night. Clearly, Germany is not the most competitive European country at everything. Of course at least, it allows Spain to boast of some success from the Euros – well they are certainly more successful than France were at the games, anyway.
When we look under the surface of last week’s summit, we find that, in reality, the decisions taken were, of course, just another set of short-term stopgaps. Perhaps they relieve the immediate pressure points but it was hardly the game-changer that the Irish Prime Minister claimed. Using the bank recapitalisation and buying bonds may give Spain and Italy some breathing space. However, I find it slightly ironic that the same people in this House who want to bash the bankers and propose a financial transaction tax – to punish the bankers at every opportunity – are the same people that are perfectly happy for the risks and profligacy of those same bankers to be transferred on to the backs of taxpayers through these bailout funds.
Initially, the markets responded positively on Friday – finally perhaps they had seen some signs of life from EU leaders. However, as is usual in these things, already the deal seems to be unravelling. Countries like Finland and the Netherlands are challenging the new roles for the bailout funds that they seemed to have agreed to in the summit on Thursday night. When the dust has settled, the small print is read and the details are finally discussed, I fear that the outcome of this summit could be far less seismic than many in this House want to believe.
That is because, yet again, the fundamental questions have not been answered. The lack of competitiveness of many countries has not been addressed. The possible mutualisation of debts has yet again been avoided. Relying on the ESM and the EFSF is no long-term solution to this crisis because they are not bottomless pits of money with the power to grant our every wish. If they are being committed to bank bailouts and used for secondary bond purchases, will there, in fact, be anything left over for the sovereign bailouts for which, let us remember, they were originally, intended?
Let us not pretend that even this relatively small shift in German policy was arrived at with great harmony. Even for these few small concessions, it seems that Italy had to hold the proverbial gun to Germany’s head. In reality, what we saw in the Council highlighted that, even for countries in the euro, the mentality is still one of maximising national interests. Now do not get me wrong, I fully support national governments fighting their corner, but let us also be clear that the euro was never a tool aimed at helping countries to defend their national interests. As Margaret Thatcher remarked in 1990, the single currency is about the politics of Europe. It is about a federal Europe by the back door.
The great irony of it is that this very tool that was intended to unify the peoples of Europe is, in fact, now driving them further apart, because it was always inevitable that permanent fiscal transfers would be required from the north to the south, with Germany acting as the paymaster of less competitive countries. It was also inevitable that we would see the supranationalisation of economic policy, effectively rendering national democracy defunct within the eurozone. In the future, will there, in fact, be much point in holding elections in many eurozone countries if their budgets and fiscal policies are going to be rewritten by Brussels every time? This is not a small point that should be brushed under the carpet; it is a fundamental issue of accountability of government to the peoples in their own democracies.
At the moment, we face an impasse: Germany wants to supplant economic policy at EU level; the Mediterranean countries want Germany to underwrite their debts. I am reminded of the story of the two politicians. One says to the other, ‘OK, let’s be honest with each other’; the other one says, ‘all right, but you first’. Inevitably, someone has to move first – but let us never forget that there is an alternative. It is for the eurozone to reduce in size so that some countries have the ability to devalue their way back to relative competitiveness. That would be a political disaster for the euro’s cheerleaders, but for some countries, it remains the least worst option and a possible way out of this crisis."@en1
|
| lpv:spokenAs | |
| lpv:unclassifiedMetadata | |
| lpv:videoURI |
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples