Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2011-01-20-Speech-4-129-000"
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"en.20110120.6.4-129-000"2
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"The European Union strategy for the Black Sea region resembles a yeti. Everyone talks about it, but no one has seen it. This belief of mine is strengthened by some of the contradictions I can see right at the beginning of the resolution. First, there is the definition of the Black Sea region. It is rather curious that Azerbaijan, a country on the Caspian Sea, is included, while Macedonia is not, although its two closest neighbours, Bulgaria and Greece, are included in the Black Sea region, ‘in accordance with the European Commission definition’. I had no idea that Greece stretches all the way to the shores of the Black Sea. The 13 areas of cooperation where greater EU involvement is anticipated in the region comprise a very extensive list. It seems that the Commission did not previously appreciate the importance of this region. Ultimately, given that EUR 1.5 million was taken from a pilot project on the environment and the development of the region in the spring of this year and redirected to a project on bananas in the ACP countries, I would have to query the information on which the Commission based such a decision. It is curious that the author ‘failed to notice’ the South Stream gas pipeline, yet mentions the controversial and not fully funded Nabucco project. I would like to emphasise that the opportunity to enter into partnership relationships with various EU regions will be very important for the further development of the region, excluding the area mentioned before. The conclusions from the last debate on suspending visas with Ukraine are missing."@en1
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