Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2010-12-15-Speech-3-011"
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"en.20101215.5.3-011"2
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".
Mr President, it is not often that we have come together at the end of the year with greater cause for concern. We are deeply concerned because Europe finds itself in the midst of a growing and multiplying crisis of confidence. There are causes for this crisis of confidence and I would like to attempt to describe some of them here today. I believe that we are confronted by a double salami-slicing approach. There is the approach taken by those who are trying to conceal the actual situation from the citizens of a country. It seriously shakes people’s confidence when governments say to them: ‘Everything is fine, no problem, we have it all under control’ and then suddenly turn around and explain that they need countless billions of euros in aid. This has occurred twice now. I do not know whether a government will once again say that it has everything under control and can finance its bonds, even if interest rates are rising, and then suddenly change its mind and say: ‘We need a rescue package. Help us!’. This must not happen. We need an inventory of the actual national debts and bank debts. I believe that it will create more confidence if we explain what the real situation is, however bad it might be. If all the cards are on the table, then it is easier for us to look for solutions.
However, there is also the salami-slicing approach on the other side. This is what happens when the strong countries say ‘We do not need to help’. We hear the renationalisation message: ‘We are not prepared to pay for the others’, despite the fact that the countries which are saying that know that we will ultimately all have to stand together and pay up. The salami-slicing approach of not telling the people the truth, although you know that you will have to pay in your own interest, is just as damaging to confidence.
We are currently preparing for a meeting of the European Council. What about the different voices there? One is in favour of eurobonds and another is opposed. One says stabilise the rescue package and build it up, another says do not build it up. I wonder where the logic lies in explaining that these are all just temporary measures, because we have everything under control, but we have to include the temporary measures in the treaty, so that they are available in the long term. Everyone notices a contradiction of this kind and that also shakes people’s confidence. It damages confidence when a government subjects its banks to a stress test in the summer and only a few months later realises that it was really a stress test for the euro and not for the banks.
We are in the midst of a crisis of confidence and I must say to you, Mr Barroso, that although what you said this morning may be true, it gives the impression not that we will look for the best solutions and put them in place, but instead that we will discuss the minimum consensus which we can reach on Friday. That is simply not enough. It will heighten the crisis of confidence. A policy which pacifies the national markets in the short term is not enough. We need a policy which stabilises the markets and the euro. Why is no one in this House or in the European Council talking about the external value of the euro? Today the euro is trading at 1.34 against the US dollar. Its lowest value during the crisis was 1.20 and when it was introduced it was worth 1.15. The euro is a stable currency. In intercontinental competition, where regions of the world compete with one another in economic terms, it is no longer the individual national currencies that count, but the currency structure of the entire region. In economic and social terms, the euro area is definitely the strongest region in the world. It is only being made politically weaker by policy makers who are implementing policies aimed at damping down national debate in the short term. The euro is strong and it could be much stronger if those who act as its political framework and those who are responsible for it would finally fulfil their obligations and take bold, consistent decisions on social and economic issues which would bring the crisis of confidence to an end. You simply need to look at what is happening in London, in Paris and in Rome. If we do not stop this crisis of confidence, we will have major problems over the next few years.
This is why I would like to say to the Council that I am in favour of eurobonds. If there is another suitable measure, then please take it, but you must finally come to an agreement on stabilising the euro internally, because it is strong enough externally."@en1
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