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"Mr President, thank you very much. I am delighted to be with you to discuss the big questions on Europe’s international agenda. So we have to deal with complex problems and we do so in a new geopolitical landscape. We need to adapt. This is not a time to fly on auto-pilot or to stick to the narrow defence of national ways of doing things. It is a time to be smart and ambitious. Let me give you some figures to illustrate the point. Europe’s share of the world’s population is 7%, down from 25% a century ago. In the last 60 years, our share of global GDP has shrunk from 28% to 21%. The economies of China, India and others are racing ahead at 10% per year. Economic weight is translating into political clout and self-confidence. You feel it everywhere: from negotiations on climate change to Iran, to big energy deals in Africa or central Asia. If we pull together, we can safeguard our interests. If not, others will make the decisions for us. It is that simple, really that simple. My preference is clear. We should respond as Europeans. Firstly, by pulling together, because unity is a pre-condition for influence and, secondly, by taking action, because the answer to a problem cannot be a paper or a meeting. If you want results, you have to act and sometimes take risks. And yes, there is a tendency in Europe to put process ahead of outcomes. Thirdly, by being both principled and creative because we must be both: principled in the defence of our values and creative in how we forge bespoke solutions to complex problems. As Mr Albertini’s report rightly points out, ‘a new approach is needed if the EU is to act collectively and meet the global challenges in a coherent, consistent and efficient manner’. Out of that general picture come several core objectives: firstly, to ensure greater stability and security in our neighbourhood, by promoting political and economic reform. This is important in itself for reasons which are very self-evident, but our wider international credibility also depends on getting our neighbourhood right. Secondly, to address global security challenges, the challenges of our time. For this, we need comprehensive strategies, strong international organisations and the rule of law both within countries and between them. Thirdly, to build a network of strategic relationships with key countries and organisations because the problems we face cannot be solved by any single actor. On top of all this comes the creation of the European External Action Service – a means to achieve the other three objectives and a way to deliver the promise of the Lisbon Treaty. Those are the core tasks to which I have devoted my time since I took on this role. I first went to Washington and New York, which was the right way to start our important relationships with the United States and the UN. I have since been to Moscow, Kiev, the Balkans and Haiti. I will go to the Middle East next week and again to New York at the end of the month. In between, I have chaired the Foreign Affairs Council three times, attended the informal European Council and met with the College of Commissioners. I have worked hard to build the necessary internal consensus, visiting various EU capitals: Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna and Ljubljana. Naturally, I have spent a significant amount of time on the creation of the External Action Service and that will continue in the weeks ahead, including working with you. That is also why, because of the interests of this House, I have ensured involvement from the European Parliament in the steering group that I set up. I will also discuss it this afternoon at the Conference of Presidents. When I come to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 23 March, we will have an opportunity for in-depth exchanges in the presence of all the relevant committees. I want to begin by thanking Mr Albertini and Mr Danjean for their excellent reports. You have underlined, if I may say, the number, range and urgency of the challenges we face. Any time you create something new, there will be resistance. Some prefer to minimise perceived losses rather than maximise collective gains. I see it differently, and I hope the Parliament does too. This is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build something new, something that finally brings together the instruments of our engagement in support of a single political strategy. A huge chance for Europe. We should not lower our ambitions but, rather, give ourselves the means to realise them. A moment to see the big picture, to be creative and take collective responsibility. If we get it right – and we must – then we will be able to shape a European foreign policy for the 21st century with an external service designed to achieve it: one where we mobilise all our levers of influence – political, economic, development and crisis management tools – in a coordinated way. A service that represents the European Union in geographic and gender terms too. I believe that is the only acceptable way to go. Let me illustrate what I have in mind when I say ‘comprehensive approach’ with a couple of examples. The Western Balkans – I was pleased to travel to the region recently. In a way, the Balkans is the birthplace of EU foreign policy. More than anywhere else, it is where we cannot afford to fail. My purpose was to establish good working relations with political leaders, engage with civil society about what belonging to Europe could mean, and ensure coordination among the different EU actors on the ground. One conclusion I drew was that the region is making progress, even if it is uneven and incomplete. The European perspective remains the overarching framework – both as our objective and as the main incentive for reform. As I stressed everywhere, progress on the path to the EU depends on the commitment to reform at home. On human rights, the rule of law and regional cooperation. We are backing up our strategy with available foreign-policy tools. In Kosovo, we have our biggest civilian mission and it is a success. In Bosnia, we have adjusted ALTHEA as the situation has stabilised and developed a training programme. We are pushing the European message hard in the run-up to the October elections. Throughout the region, we are making progress on visa liberalisation and people-to-people contact. So our Balkan Strategy is what it should be: strategic in its objectives, multi-faceted in terms of instruments and tailor-made in terms of implementation. The second example is the Horn of Africa. It highlights the interplay of state fragility, poverty, resource competition including water, with piracy, terrorism and organised crime. The only possible answer is a comprehensive one, which is exactly what we are doing. Our naval operation Atalanta has been widely hailed as a success. Our next step is to further develop our options for the transfer of suspected pirates for prosecution in the region. We are adding a training mission for the TFG in Somalia, with deployment expected in the spring. Through our Stability Instrument, we are funding flanking measures to build capacity, to train the maritime authorities and moving ahead with long-term development work in Yemen and Somalia on poverty, literacy and health. The way we are engaged in Georgia follows the same script. When a frozen conflict erupted into open conflict in August 2008, we responded immediately. We took the international lead, we brokered a truce and deployed a 300-strong monitoring mission in record time. Since then, we are engaged across the spectrum of Community and CSDP means of preventing a return to violence and building stability in Georgia and in the region. With the UN and OSCE, we lead the Geneva talks, the only forum where all concerned meet. We hosted a donors’ conference for reconstruction and economic support in Georgia and we included Georgia – together with Armenia and Azerbaijan – in the European Neighbourhood Policy. We continue to promote those reforms and closer ties. We work on trade and visa liberalisation and we support confidence building measures to rebuild ties with the breakaway republics. There is more work to do in Georgia, and we have a full agenda when we discuss it with Russia, as I did only 10 days ago with Sergey Lavrov. In this case, we demonstrated what the EU can do when we fully mobilise the resources we have. Those who were involved in those incredibly hectic weeks have told me that what was done in this case was exceptional. So we need stronger structures, more flexibility and better preparedness if we want Georgia to be the benchmark for our action in the future. From strengthening the rule of law in Kosovo to working with the emerging powers to share responsibility for global governance, from promoting peace in the Middle East – and may I join Vice-President Biden in condemning the decision to build 1 600 new houses in East Jerusalem – to providing shelter to the surviving victims of Haiti’s earthquake, which I visited last week, from dealing with proliferation problems such as Iran, to devising effective answers to ‘new’ challenges such as energy, climate change and cyber security. Let me turn to our common security and defence policy and say that I agree with the broad thrust of the Danjean report about how important our missions are. They save lives, create the space for functioning politics to work and they mean that Europe can draw on all its instruments of power to meet its responsibilities. It is striking to me how far we have come in the last ten years. More than 70 000 men and women have been deployed in that period in more than 20 missions. We do crisis management in a European way with a comprehensive approach in support of international law and agreements and in close cooperation with our key partners. We work well with NATO together in Bosnia and Herzegovina and along the coast of Somalia. In Kosovo and Afghanistan, it is more difficult because of the political issues. We need to get this right so I am working with the NATO Secretary General to improve EU-NATO relations in practical areas and set a positive climate. Let us see how we can develop our relations pragmatically. The UN is another key partner. There are many good examples of EU and UN cooperation on the ground – the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and indeed Kosovo. In recent times, we have got to know each other better, but we can and should strengthen this by focusing on areas such as planning and the sharing of best practice. In the Danjean report, and more widely, people raise the question of whether it is time for the EU to have its own permanent operations headquarters. It is a serious issue that needs a serious debate. No one contests that we need a headquarters able to plan and conduct military operations. The question is whether the current system, relying on SHAPE or national headquarters, is the most efficient way or if something else is better. We often find ourselves approaching this in terms of structures. I think we first need to do the analysis of what functions we need to perform. I see three main functions from which the decisions should flow: one, the ability to plan and conduct military operations, including advance planning, and to be able to react quickly when there is a need; two, the ability to develop civil-military coordination in a more structured way to maximise our capacity; and, three, the ability to establish links with others, to optimise the overall coordination and what we loosely call the ‘international community’. If we use that analysis as the starting point for our discussions, we should be able to establish the necessary common ground and move forward to determine what we should do. The report also calls for the establishment of a Defence Council, an idea that I know has been around for some time. The next meeting in April will follow established practice, but at the informal Defence Ministers’ meeting, a consensus emerged based on my proposals to hold Foreign Affairs Councils in Ministry of Defence formation. That would enable Defence Ministers to come together and take decisions, for instance, on capabilities development. My last point on that relates to the suggestion of a civil protection force. Let us start with the Haiti lessons learned exercise which is now under way. Then let us apply the spirit of Lisbon and see what options we have to mobilise assets of Member States together with EU instruments to support either the UN, OCHA or to act as the EU itself. The watchwords ought to be maximising synergies and avoiding ‘hard’ or artificial splits between how we handle EU internal and external crises. Let me, finally, turn to the question of non-proliferation, given the oral question that has been raised. I want to mention briefly the two most significant items: first, the Non-proliferation Treaty review conference scheduled for May in New York. I will be participating with the aim of ensuring that we do get a successful outcome. We should make no mistake: the entire treaty-based non-proliferation system with the NPT as a cornerstone is under growing pressure. To respond, we need to be ready to make our contribution: on access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in particular, for developing countries, while avoiding proliferation risks, and that includes work on the multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approaches – I think 84 countries have benefited from EU assistance programmes; with progress on nuclear disarmament – politically, this is fundamental to create a constructive atmosphere; and by addressing regional proliferation crises, in particular with Iran, which has the potential to derail the conference. As you know, the EU is leading the efforts to find diplomatic solutions. We fully support the Security Council process on further restrictive measures if – as is certainly the case today – Iran continues to ignore its obligations. Secondly, there is President Obama’s Nuclear Security summit. We share the goal of the summit, namely, to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and prevent terrorists from getting access. I think that the EU has been providing support to the IAEA since 2004 to assist countries in this area and we will continue to do so. Finally, let me come back to where I started. The demand for European global engagement is enormous. We have to ensure that supply matches demand. The Lisbon Treaty gives us that chance. We should act in line with the letter and the spirit of the treaty, remembering why European leaders negotiated the treaty in the first place. I think the reason was clear: to build a stronger, more assertive and self-confident European foreign policy at the service of the citizens of the European Union. I know many in this House share that goal, and I count on your support to make sure it happens. Europe is going through a phase of building something new, where people have to adjust their mental maps and institutions have to find their new place. Doing so is messy and complicated – but also exciting, for it is impossible to overstate how important this moment is. Right now we have a chance to build what many across Europe – and many in this House – have long wanted: a stronger, more credible European foreign policy. Of course, the European External Action Service will be key to delivering this. We have to build a system that is robust, that will enable us to deal with the problems of today and the new problems that will arise tomorrow. For years, we have been trying to frame and implement comprehensive strategies but the structures and the systems we had made this difficult. With the Lisbon Treaty and the External Action Service, we should now be able to achieve this. At the heart of everything we do lies a simple truth: to protect our interests and promote our values, we must be engaged abroad. No one can hope to be an island of stability and prosperity in a sea of insecurity and injustice. Ours is, if I may say, a world in flux. To engage with it effectively, we need to frame it first. To me, the most striking features of today’s world are twofold. One, a deep interdependence in political, economic and security terms: technologies, ideas, diseases, money – everything moves. We are connected in ways we have never been before. Two, the fact that power is shifting, both within political systems – roughly from governments to markets, media and NGOs – and between political systems – roughly from the old ‘West’ to both the east and the south. Both are the outcome of globalisation which is not just an economic but also a political phenomenon, both in its manifestations and, of course, its consequences. Think of the rise of China and others as major political players, or consider the political impact of the financial crisis. The debts are in the West; the surpluses are in the East. This redistribution of financial power is also shaping our political discussions. Or consider climate change, which is not just an environmental problem but also one with security and geopolitical ramifications."@en1
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