Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2010-02-25-Speech-4-066"
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"en.20100225.5.4-066"2
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"Mr President, the train accident in Buizingen on Monday, 15 February 2010 was a shocking tragedy. I understand that in the aftermath of this serious accident, several technical and political questions concerning rail safety can be asked.
For the systems to work, trains and lines must therefore be equipped with a compatible system. Levels of safety and performance of the various national automatic train protection systems are different, as are the rules concerning equipment of lines and locomotives in these national systems.
The incompatibility of the different national systems poses a major problem for international trains because either locomotives have to be changed at each border or they have to be equipped with as many onboard systems as there are systems on the tracks that they will run on. There are even cases where different national systems coexist in one single country. The Thalys, for example, has to be equipped with seven different national systems to run in four countries.
For this reason, a single system for use at European level has been designed and developed and is currently being installed on major international lines and trains in Europe. The system is known as ERTMS – European Rail Traffic Management System.
As regards the timing, we can say that most of the national systems were developed in the early 1980s but their deployment is a long and costly process. In most countries, only part of the national networks and locomotives are equipped today and this partial equipment took approximately 20 years.
The ERTMS specifications have been available since 2000. A number of pilot projects were carried out between 2000 and 2005. Since 2005, several ERTMS-equipped lines have been put into service. At present, 10 Member States have lines with ERTMS and there are ongoing projects in almost all Member States. In Belgium, for example, the line between Aachen and Liège is equipped, and ICT trains running on this line are equipped as well.
ERTMS was created primarily with a view to promoting interoperability. That means the possibility for locomotives to cross borders, but it is also recognised as a system offering an advantage in terms of increased safety. The system is fully operational today but, due to the long time needed to install it on board trains and the long lines, existing national systems will continue to coexist with ERTMS along the lines.
Third countries like Taiwan, to give just one example, have also chosen ERTMS, and not just for operability reasons. Taiwan invested in ERTMS simply because the system is the best system available on the market today.
Several questions were asked about comparing the situation between Member States. It is quite difficult and not very useful to establish a ranking of the Member States and make meaningful comparisons. It all depends on the choice of indicators, the reference period and the quality of the data reported. One or two serious accidents can also have a significant impact on whatever type of ranking we may have.
Overall data show that the Belgian performance is average. It is true, however, that Belgium lags behind the European average in terms of tracks equipped with an automatic train protection system, be it the national or the European one.
First of all, my thoughts are with the victims of this tragedy and their relatives. It is always difficult to find words of consolation for these sad occasions and silence is sometimes more telling. The causes of the accident are not yet fully known and the technical investigation has been launched in accordance with the provisions of the EU Safety Directive.
It is the responsibility of the Belgian investigation body to carry this out. It should be accomplished independently of any judicial inquiry. The objective of the technical investigation is not to apportion blame and liability, but rather to identify causes with a view to improving railway safety and the prevention of accidents.
The Belgian investigation body has asked the European Railway Agency to support it in its investigation. Two investigators from the agency joined the Belgian team in charge of the investigation just a few hours after the accident occurred.
I would like to stress that, since the causes of the accident have not yet been clarified, it is inappropriate to draw conclusions. Of course, I am prepared to clarify some issues, which were raised in the aftermath of this tragedy, and I will share with you my understanding of the situation.
As is too often the case when rail accidents happen, remarks alleging a link between European rules or regulations and the accident are made. I would first like to be very clear on the opening-up of the market. Alongside the opening-up of the rail freight sector to competition and the establishment of requirements to separate the activities of infrastructure managers and railway undertakings, a stringent regulatory framework has been introduced governing rail safety and interoperability. We want to ensure that the high level of rail safety is maintained, while recognising the procedures and methods specific to each Member State in this area.
The European Railway Agency produces reports at regular intervals on the safety of the European network and monitors the development of the situation in the Member States.
Indicators demonstrate that the opening up of the rail sector to competition has in no way had a negative impact on railway safety. Let me say very clearly that any proposition linking rail safety levels to the opening-up of the rail market is, in my view, just an excuse to steer the debate away from the true causes of the accident.
The question of the coexistence of national and European train control systems can be put in these terms. More than 20 different national systems are used in Europe today to ensure the safe movement of trains. These systems developed at national level consist of a trackside component and an onboard component. The trackside component sends information to a computer in the train, and the computer applies the brakes when a dangerous situation is detected."@en1
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