Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2010-02-24-Speech-3-087"
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"en.20100224.13.3-087"2
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"Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I am glad that we have had this debate; I am glad that I accepted your invitation to come here, at the very beginning of the process of the 2020 strategy, because the debate has only just begun. We had a debate just recently, on 11 February, we will have a spring Council at the end of March, and we will finalise the 2020 strategy, or the strategy for employment and economic growth, at the end of June. We therefore have a considerable amount of time in which to exchange views and determine the course of action once and for all.
As for the economic strategy, it is all very well for some to say that we need more constraints. However, as far as economic guidelines are concerned, the Treaty of Lisbon does not make provision for that. I myself did not draw up the Treaty of Lisbon, others did, but it does not provide for any sanctions, penalties, or negative measures as regards the implementation of the economic guidelines. Take a close look at Article 121 so that you are fully aware of this. Political commitment at both European and national level is therefore crucial, and without this political commitment, nothing will be done.
One final word about Greece. I believe that we have sent out the right message. We have conveyed the message of the responsibility of the Greek Government, which must handle an extremely difficult situation, a situation that it inherited. It is taking some brave measures. On 11 February, it told us that if the current measures are not enough to achieve a reduction in the deficit of 4% of GDP in 2010, it would take additional measures. We have made a commitment to carry out more monitoring, not only on the initiative of the European Commission, but also with the help of the European Central Bank and even of experts from the International Monetary Fund. I therefore believe that we really have framed and defined very clearly the aspect of responsibility. If necessary, there is, of course, an element of solidarity. Greece has said that it does not want to use that, but we have provided for two messages: a message of responsibility and a message of solidarity, if necessary.
Naturally, we must draw conclusions from what has happened in Greece in recent years. In the euro area too, we must be more proactive with regard to both data collection and politics itself. This crisis was also a challenge, a challenge in the sense that we must practise the policy of coordination more. In fact, every crisis is a challenge. We must learn lessons from every crisis. Well, we will learn them. In the same way as we learnt lessons from the crisis of the 1930s, we must now also learn lessons from the financial crisis: more regulation, more monitoring of bonuses, a more far-reaching banking policy. However, we must also learn all the lessons from the experience of Greece and others.
Ladies and gentlemen, I believe that I have felt the same ambition in this House; I have felt the same political will to pursue an economic policy and strategy which can cope with the difficulties that we face today. As many of you have said, this is not just the responsibility of one or two people; all the European institutions and all the Member States must assume collective responsibility. Otherwise, we will not save our social model; otherwise, we will lose our position in the world. It is therefore in this frame of mind that I have come to meet you here this afternoon, and it is in this frame of mind that I will continue my work.
I therefore welcome this European ambition that I have found here this afternoon, and I welcome this sense of urgency that I have encountered this afternoon. There was one speech for which I have nothing but contempt, but I am not going to comment on that further.
As far as the economic strategy is concerned, I will make a distinction between three periods. The first period is the period that we are still in now, in other words, the financial crisis and all its consequences. Allow me to use a different language from what I have heard this afternoon throughout the entire debate. I will explain. I would like to use a language that also reflects what is positive about the European Union, because surprising though it may seem, there are also positive things that have happened recently. We have drawn consequences and learnt lessons from the crisis of the 1930s. We now find ourselves one year on from the major crisis and, in fact, in 2010, we now have positive growth in most countries once more. That did not happen during the 1930s. The crisis actually lasted until the end of the decade.
Why do we have this positive growth now? Because we have taken measures. We have taken measures to save the financial institutions, not because we particularly like them as such, but because, without them, there is no economy. We have conducted an intelligent monetary policy. We have injected liquidity into the economy, something that no one did 70 years ago. For at least 16 countries, we have created a zone of monetary stability, in spite of all the problems. In the 1930s, we had competitive devaluations. We have not had them today. We have conducted a risky budgetary policy using budgetary deficits to stimulate the economy. We did not do what was done in the 1930s, namely restore budgetary equilibrium as quickly as possible. Therefore, we have protected our internal market, which is not perfect. We must improve it, and Mr Monti will provide us with some concrete proposals. However, we have not lapsed back into the protectionism of the 1930s. Therefore, we have learnt some lessons from the major crisis that we have just experienced.
I would even go a step further. It is thanks to the European Union that the G20 was born; we were the ones who took the initiative to create this embryonic world governance. It is the first time that the big powers, new and old, have come together to combat the crisis, in an imperfect way, but we will continue to work along these lines. So Europe, the European Union, should not always be put on the defensive. There are also some very positive things that have been produced.
Now we must leave this strategy, this so-called exit strategy, behind. We have to find a balance between abandoning the budgetary stimuli too quickly and returning, in the medium term, to budgetary equilibrium, which is absolutely necessary to fund our pension system, our social security system and our health care system. So it is a difficult balance that we have to find, and the Stability and Growth Pact provides us with the means to do it, because it does not require an immediate return to budgetary equilibrium. It requires a step-by-step approach, whereby we first reach a stage of 3% and then, in the medium term, budgetary equilibrium. I think that we have conducted and we are continuing to conduct a wise policy.
As far as the Lisbon Strategy is concerned, we know its handicaps, but we must not forget either that the financial and economic crisis has completely disrupted the implementation of the Lisbon agenda. There have, of course, been omissions; I am not going to list them here, they are well known. I will say this, however: we need some major reforms, or important reforms, and these important reforms, at European level and nationally, will demand budgetary choices. It is not by chance – and I have repeated this in the written conclusions that you have read – that we want to link the budgetary discussion, effectively in its legal framework of the Stability and Growth Pact, to economic reforms. This is because, if we say that we need to do more research and development, for example, then we must make provision for that in the national budgets and in the European Union’s financial perspective. That means that some budgetary choices will need to be made.
Another consequence of the choices we are making for the Lisbon Strategy is that the goals that we are proposing will not always be soft goals. It so happens that they could be hard goals. This is where it gets difficult. There is, on the one hand, the demand for reforms and, on the other, the implementation of the reforms. I do not say that I have heard it here, but outside this House, at European level, people are demanding hard measures, major reforms, hard reforms, and when people go back to their countries, I see few results of all that. We therefore need a consistent position. It is not just the European Union that will implement reforms. We can encourage them, stimulate them and provide the right framework for them, but it is at national level that a large number of reforms will have to be made, and therefore, it is a matter of demonstrating significant political will, and political commitment is the most important thing.
It is often said that we need more binding measures. However, we should think about this. I have made quite a few proposals, which I believe are more intelligent than binding measures. However, even the Stability and Growth Pact, which contains many binding measures, has failed to put some countries back on track. Therefore, the method is not everything, the method does not resolve everything, and without political engagement, without commitment, the method is worthless."@en1
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