Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2008-11-17-Speech-1-061"

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"en.20081117.21.1-061"2
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"Mr President, Commissioner, Mrs Berès, Mr Langen, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to begin by congratulating your two rapporteurs on the report they have submitted to you and to us, since we are reading it and we are debating it. This report is fair and goes far enough to ensure that we will be kept busy during the coming months. Integration and supervision of the financial markets – that is another area of considerations that your rapporteurs have covered in their report. The G20 has set us an ambitious road map; it must be translated into concrete action by the G20, and hence by the European Union and by the members of the Eurogroup. You will no doubt recall that the member countries of the Eurogroup and those of the European Union were the first to demand that appropriate lessons be learnt from the crisis we are facing, and I do not wish to save my memories of that episode for a later date. For four years we – I am talking about those in charge of the Eurogroup – have kept on repeating to the Japanese and US ministers of finance and have kept on drawing the attention of our US friends both to the risks of their double deficit and to the risks created by systematically underestimating the risks, especially with regard to real estate. For two years several of us, at G7 level and in particular under the German Presidency of the G7, demanded, with a certain bluntness of tone, more extensive regulation of the financial markets. I do not take kindly to the fact that those who rejected this in the past are today giving the impression of leading the European response. The US and UK Governments had all the time they needed to accept the Eurogroup’s proposals on better regulation of the financial markets; they did not wish to do so. They should not give the impression today that they are leading the others. On the enlargement of the Euro Zone, I have nothing to say that differs from what your rapporteurs said. I would simply point out that, belonging to the Euro Zone is, of course, an advantage, an opportunity, but that it also entails obligations of which some will have to be met before accession to the Euro Zone is possible. This entirely understandable enthusiasm for the new formation of the G7 does, however, cause problems concerning the external representation of the Euro Zone. We have always appealed, within the Eurogroup, for the European Union and the Eurogroup to have a greater presence at the G20, at the International Monetary Fund and at the Financial Stability Fund. We, at the Eurogroup, were the first to demand a lasting and permanent seat for the Commission at the G20, something that did not prevent the President of the Commission from not claiming the Presidency of the Eurogroup – the consequences of which we shall see later. However, we believe that the European Central Bank and the Commission should be represented on a long-term basis at the G20, as should the Eurogroup, whether it be represented by the President of the Eurogroup, who is modestly trying to lead the finance ministers’ work, to which Mr Sarkozy commented that they were unequal, or by someone else. I am not seeking the Presidency of the Eurogroup at minister of finance level for my own pleasure and glory, which is hardly inexhaustible; I am doing so out of a sense of duty. If others think that they can do a better job of these tasks, then let them do so, but they should apply the same intensity to them in the years to come as they give the impression of wanting to do at the present time. For the rest, with regard to the EMU’s economic instruments and the governance of our group, I believe that, over the last few years, we have made remarkable progress, but when we debate exchange policy and monetary policy at international level, it is unthinkable that the world’s second major currency should not be represented in political and monetary terms by those responsible for managing these two aspects and these two areas of our common policy. If we want the ministers of finance within the Eurogroup properly to manage the economic strand of Economic and Monetary Union, then the various Heads of State or Government need to give their ministers of finance the necessary instructions. In Luxembourg, as you know, this presents no problem whatsoever. I agree with the analysis made in Mrs Berès’s and Mr Langen’s report on the assessment of the first ten years of the single currency. There is nothing to add or to remove from what they have expressed in their report. Furthermore, it is a report that has the support of a large majority within this House, at least where the Commission has expressed its opinion on it. I note that the House’s enthusiasm for the single currency is far more pronounced today than it was 12 or 13 years ago, even 10 years ago, and we should be pleased about that. With regard to the economic divergences, the deltas between structural reforms and the differences in terms of the management of public finances, I should like first of all to point out that I did not understand what the report meant when it said that the results do not live up to the expectations that existed at the time of the introduction of the single currency. I know of no quantitative report on the divergences between the various Member States of the Euro Zone. Given that this report does not exist, it is therefore a circumstantial comment, which I did not understand. I do share the view that these divergences tend at times to increase, something which, until now, has not threatened the cohesion of the Euro Zone but, were this divergence to persist, could harm its cohesion in the long term. For the rest, and in this regard, we should be pleased that Europe – the European Union in general and the Eurogroup in particular – which is today faced with one of the most serious crises that it has had to tackle over the past few decades, has competently managed the crisis in which we currently find ourselves, not least by avoiding making the mistakes that were made in Europe during the 1970s. To say that we have not repeated the same mistakes is no small thing, for economically and politically, this has enabled us to prevent the crisis from increasing the divergences within the monetary Union and from helping to undermine its cohesion. The fact is, in the face of a crisis of the size that we are experiencing and in the face of a crisis that is increasingly extending to the real economy, a strong and coordinated economic policy response at European level is necessary, and we need to reflect on the best way of organising it by taking account, on the one hand, of our conceptual and regulatory framework – I am referring here to the Stability and Growth Pact and to the Lisbon Strategy – and, on the other, of the seriousness of the crisis, the consequences of which are far graver than we imagined a few months ago. The creation of the world’s second major currency certainly brings advantages, but it also entails obligations, with the G20 of last Friday and Saturday in Washington reminding us of the obligations of ourselves and others. We have to use and make the most of the three weeks we have before the December European Council in order to skilfully hone our European strategy and to prevent disparate responses at national level. These disparate responses threaten us, of course. It moves me to hear the calls and renewed calls for economic policy coordination that are mainly expressed in the language of Voltaire. I should like those who are calling for the coordination of economic policies first and foremost to set an example and demonstrate the sincerity of their words. I note that the various governments of the various member countries of the Euro Zone are pouncing greedily, and justifiably, on the problems being faced by their countries’ automobile sector. I should like those who talk about the automobile sector and who continually talk about the coordination of economic policies to coordinate their national actions when it comes to taking initiatives in the automobile sector. The rest is of trifling importance. Really coordinate and prove, with an example to hand, the sincerity of those words. With regard to monetary policy, you know how timid I am, I would never utter a word about it, except to say that I continue to believe that the role played by the European Central Bank over the last few months was truly exemplary."@en1
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