Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2007-09-26-Speech-3-239"
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"en.20070926.18.3-239"2
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"Madam President, the situation in Chad and the Central African Republic is difficult for the people affected, and I therefore support, in principle, engagement by the EU to stabilise the situation and improve the real conditions of life for the people concerned.
In his statement of 27 August the President of the UN Security Council described the international community's intentions to deploy an EU operation for 12 months with the goal of bridging the time gap until the deployment of a UN-led mission. That is why the EU has also clearly limited the operation to a period of one year. I am convinced that we need a robust mandate here; that means not limiting ourselves purely to self-defence, but being able to pursue our objectives, if necessary, in the face of opposition from those who wish to stop us doing so.
The text of yesterday's Security Council resolution points in this direction: it refers to a ‘multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons’. We are authorised ‘to take all necessary measures’.
I urge the Council to ensure that this force is not simply a cosmetically enhanced French force. In terms of the nationality of the commander, too, local sensitivities should be respected. Unfortunately, France has not been neutral so far in the conflicts in Chad and the Central African Republic, but has traditionally supported the government. For that reason, the language chosen for the command and operation at local level should be English, so that the people at least understand that these Europeans are obviously different from the ones they are accustomed to seeing.
Indeed, while I am on the subject of Britain, the UK has prevented the EU's Command Headquarters in Brussels from leading the operation, and in my view, this warrants considerable criticism. Not participating yourself but denying others the use of joint structures: that is something that we should not accept from those who drop out in future!
As regards the achievability of the goals, I still have doubts. Have we set ourselves clear objectives? How many of the internally displaced persons should be back home by the end of the year? How many refugees from Darfur should have returned to Darfur? We would not have achieved enough if we handed on the baton after a year with the same number of people still in the camps.
The costs are also considerable: I hear that it will cost EUR 100 million just to build a suitable runway and headquarters. Then there are the ongoing costs of the troops. Can the Council give us any specific details of the overall financial framework?
I have one final, but to my mind crucial, point: before deploying the force we must have an explicit assurance from the Government of Chad that it will subsequently endorse the deployment of a UN-led force, whatever the composition may be. I have heard what our colleague has said. I would like to have that confirmed in writing, in the form of an official document from the Government of Chad, not verbally from the Minister in the UN Security Council. When I have this assurance, I can vote for the project. Otherwise, we really will face the alternative, after a year, of either having to extend the operation or withdrawing and leaving a military vacuum in which an identical situation to the present one could very quickly arise. In that event, we would literally have allowed hundreds of millions to run into the sand."@en1
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