Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2007-03-12-Speech-1-197"

Predicate	Value (sorted: default)
rdf:type	lpv_eu:Speech2
dcterms:Date	"2007-03-12"^^xsd:date2
dcterms:Is Part Of	lp_eu:One share, one vote - Proportionality between ownership and control in EU listed companies (debate)2
dcterms:Language	"de"^^xsd:language2
lpv:document identification number	"en.20070312.23.1-197"2
lpv:hasSubsequent	lp_eu:2007-03-12-Speech-1-1982
lpv:speaker	lp:Wolf Klinz2
lpv:spokenAs	member; Delegation to the EU-Mexico Joint Parliamentary Committee (2004-09-15--2009-07-13)3 substitute; IMCO (2007-02-05--2009-07-13)3 member; ECON (2007-01-31--2009-07-13)3 substitute; Delegation for relations with Switzerland, Iceland and Norway and to the European Economic Area (EEA) Joint Parliamentary Committee (2004-09-15--2009-07-13)3 unknown; Freie Demokratische Partei - Die Liberalen (2004-07-20--2009-07-13)3 member; Committee of Inquiry into the crisis of the Equitable Life Assurance Society (2006-01-19--2007-06-19)3 substitute; Delegation for relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council (2004-09-15--2007-03-13)3 member; ALDE (2004-07-20--2009-07-13)3
lpv:translated text	". Mr President, the principle of ‘one share equals one vote’ is a very attractive one in what is termed ‘shareholder democracy’, and Commissioner McCreevy – who is responsible for these things – fears that any deviation from it might diminish transparency and curtail the shareholders’ rights, but modifications do not necessarily have to be damaging in their effects, for they can bring with them more competition and innovation, while at the same time taking account of the different types of shareholders, who have differing interests and behave in different ways. The Commission is now planning to publish, in the autumn, a recommendation on the principle of proportionality between capital and control, which will be based on the results of an extensive study. Mr Lehne has already referred to the problematic aspects of this recommendation, and Mrs Berès has – I think rightly – surmised that a survey entrusted to ISS, the European Corporate Government Institute, and Sherman [amp] Sterling might well not be as objective as the matter in hand might require, and so I appeal to the Commission to delay its practical proposals until after extensive and objective consideration of how things stand in Europe and after a critical and all-embracing assessment of our experience with the Takeovers Directive. What is important in this is that consideration be given to the advantages and disadvantages of all systems deviating from the ‘one share, one vote’ norm, whether pyramid structures in Italy, preferential shares in Germany, double voting in France or the ‘A’ and ‘B’ shares found in the Nordic countries. We have to carefully distinguish between, and balance against each other, the desire to make the shareholder’s control proportionate to the shares he owns and the company’s desire for contractual freedom, between stable shareholding structures on the one hand and sufficient discretion on the other, with it being guaranteed in each instance that any deviation from the ‘one share – one vote’ standard will be transparent, and that the shareholders are entitled to know whether or not the shares they own or acquire limit their ability to play a part in determining the business’s direction and their control over the way it is managed."@en1

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