Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2007-01-31-Speech-3-146"
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"en.20070131.20.3-146"2
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Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, as always I shall be perfectly sincere in my reply to this House, and I shall also address the points on which I do not share your views.
Mrs Roure asked me whether we can give Parliament our information on the negotiating mandate. As you know, such information is classified; nonetheless, as I said before, even though it is classified, we will find a way to keep Parliament informed, in other words a way to give you political information without violating a rule enshrined in the Treaties, whereby classified (‘EU restricted’) information cannot be published. This is the political solution that I propose: if the Treaty is amended so as to specify a mechanism by which classified acts may be communicated to Parliament, I shall apply such a rule without hesitation. It is a matter, however, of overcoming the obstacle that Parliament cannot be informed if classified material is involved. I shall keep you up to date on this.
Many people have called for a framework agreement, Mr President, which I think is the right way to go. A framework agreement on data transmission is precisely what we have started working on with the Presidency: we are setting up a joint working party to deal with a number of topics relating to personal data processing – separate, therefore, from the SWIFT case and PNR, which are going on in parallel. We believe that the time has now come to conclude a Euroatlantic political agreement – a framework agreement – with the United States on personal data processing, and we intend to work on this agreement in order to specify what kinds of data can be transmitted, for what purposes and for how long.
Ladies and gentlemen, there is a further point that has not been addressed in this debate, but which needs to be addressed: how can we preserve the confidentiality of the technical information that forms part of this agreement? Since it concerns investigation procedures, it would be a gift to criminals if it were revealed. Such information needs to be kept confidential. There is thus another problem, because it is obvious that we would be giving suspected terrorists a powerful tool if we revealed details about how they are monitored. Can a solution be found? I am quite sure that one can, but there needs to be political will on both sides.
I should like to end with a final thought: none of all that justifies the specific violations of European law and the legislative failings in the SWIFT case. You may recall that, when nobody was yet talking about a European agreement, I addressed the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the need for such an agreement, because it is much better to close a legislative gap with a European rule than to leave it to the individual Member States to legislate as they please. The SWIFT case is typical: out of 27 Member States, only seven have given me a reply. That is a sign that the issue needs to be addressed at a European level.
For all these reasons, therefore, I can assure you that 1) I believe that a political agreement is essential and that the legitimacy of such an agreement will be weaker if Parliament is not involved; and 2) such a political agreement should be aimed at solving the problems constructively, without pointing the finger at the United States as if it was the problem: the problem, ladies and gentlemen, is the terrorists, not the United States.
First, as the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs is well aware – and its chairman, Mr Cavada, is here – I have never, under any circumstances, either denied or concealed any information, including confidential information, that I could have given to the committee and thus to Parliament. I intend to continue in the same way, as I said in my introduction. Thus I do not share the opinion – which is actually to prejudge the issue – that the European institutions and Parliament in particular might be in danger of being excluded from this political process.
You are well aware that I am in favour of your being politically involved, even when the Treaties do not allow for it. I have said it a thousand times and I shall say it again: we shall find a way, and that is why I welcome Mr Cavada’s idea of even organising an agreement with the US Congress to monitor the political stages of these negotiations. It is also clear that this debate has affected Euroatlantic relations, contrary to what somebody said. I am convinced that, if Europe wants to be a leader on the world political stage, it must achieve a global balance between the right – I personally consider it a duty – to pursue and investigate terrorists and the duty to protect fundamental rights, such as the privacy of personal data.
It is therefore obvious that if, as the President-in-Office of the Council has just said, we want to achieve an overall balance together with the United States, we want to do so because we are convinced that Euroatlantic relations are crucial, not only with regard to Europe’s past history but, above all, with regard to its present and future history.
As many of you are well aware, I have on many occasions supplied detailed answers, above all to the Committee on Civil Liberties, of course, but I address Parliament when I am invited to do so and I speak to those committees that invite me. Regarding the ‘push’ system, for instance, I announced in December that experiments with such a system for passenger name records would begin before the end of the month, and they did. The experiment was started with the US Administration’s Customs and Border Protection System and Amadeus. There is a technical point regarding requests for
data, but it is a technical problem, while the ‘push’ experiment has indeed started, as we had been promised.
With regard to the number of data items, I was interested to hear what many of you had to say about the 34 items that are currently the subject of the PNR agreement. I can tell you quite openly that, as far as my part in the negotiations is concerned, I intend to call for the number of data items in question to be cut, but not because I subscribe to the idea that the US is asking for too many. If all 34 items were of use in pursuing terrorists, I would not be afraid to tell you that 34 items were needed. However, the really useful items are probably those 19 that have been mentioned: that is to say, a much smaller number.
Believe me, though, the principle that counts as regards the data to be processed is not the number of items but rather the usefulness of the data, and it is on those grounds that I intend to take action in the negotiations. I do not mean to endorse the idea that, if we cut the 34 items down to 15, we will in any case have done a good job: we may actually have done a very bad job if some of the excluded data items could have prevented a terrorist attack. I am in no doubt about one thing: I am quite certain that the main aim is to make the system effective. Who has access to the data? What for? How many data and for how long? These are the points of an agreement that we are going to start negotiating soon, and Parliament will be kept informed, as I have already said.
Ladies and gentlemen, many of you believe that passenger information is the missing factor in the PNR system. It is fair to imagine that if no consensus is reached between the two sides, no agreement will be made at the end of July. Just in my mind’s eye, I can see a very simple solution: every ticket to the United States that is purchased could come with a sheet for the passenger to sign, informing them that their data will be processed in a particular way. If that should happen – and I strongly hope that it never will – we will certainly have ensured that passengers are given information but, without an agreement at European level, passengers’ rights will be limited to the private sphere of the air carriage contract. That is an eventuality that we must avert by every possible means, which is why we must try to achieve a new European agreement. The alternative would be very simple: passengers would merely need to be asked to accept a few restrictions as part of the air carriage contract, and I believe that the majority who want to go to the United States for honest reasons would sign it. We would, however, be giving up a role for Europe that we have already played and which it is vital that we still play. That is why we need new negotiations, in part to cut down the number of data items, but in such a way that reducing the amount of data does not jeopardise the fight against terrorism.
In connection with the ATS system, I have mentioned to the Committee on Civil Liberties that I have received written assurances from the United States regarding compliance with the PNR agreement. In a speech made in this Chamber, I was criticised for not having checked the veracity of this statement. Ladies and gentlemen, if I, in Brussels, had the power to investigate the behaviour of the United States, I would have powers that no authority at either European or national level has ever had or is ever likely to have. Everything is possible, apart from checking the veracity of that letter, as I was asked to do in that speech. When I receive a formal reply saying that the rules are being complied with, I have to take it at face value unless there is evidence to the contrary. That is what happens between allies, unless you have some evidence to the contrary – which I frankly do not have, and I am being absolutely honest – because otherwise we would have to open a permanent inquiry into every minute detail of the letters we receive from the United States."@en1
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