Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2006-09-05-Speech-2-036"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20060905.5.2-036"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spoken text |
".
Mr President, this has been a very useful debate because it has focused our attention, it has provided insight and it has given me guidance, which are the essential roles of Parliament vis-à-vis the Commission.
In the event of a doubtful outcome to the Doha negotiations, we will have to look very carefully at what happens to the future of export subsidies, because that is linked to another point that has been raised in this debate – i.e. whether or not we will be more or less vulnerable to litigation at the WTO in cases brought against us on agriculture should a deal not be reached in the multilateral negotiations. If these negotiations do not succeed, I agree that it is likely that there will be an upsurge in cases brought to the WTO, especially concerning agriculture.
We in Europe can view this possibility with relative equanimity. We have reformed our common agricultural policy because it was right to do so for our own purposes and needs, as well as for the needs of others within the international trading system. To the extent that we have now implemented that reform, and will continue to do so, we are protected from litigation at the WTO. However, not all WTO members are in the same position and I certainly do not exclude the big agricultural exporters – for example Brazil and Argentina – trying the judicial road if they see that the political and negotiating one is blocked. However, others are more vulnerable to that than we are in Europe.
Before I make one final comment about timing, let me just say this about the WTO itself. Everybody – including the present Director-General of the WTO – agrees to varying degrees that the WTO would benefit from some institutional and procedural reform, as others have commented on during the course of this debate. The Sutherland Report provided some interesting ideas in this regard. However, we need to be clear in our minds on this. The present impasse in the negotiations is not due to an institutional problem but to a political one, and no institutional improvement could break the present deadlock. That is something which requires political will and an adjustment of attitude and policy on the part of certain WTO members.
That brings me to my last point, which relates to when these negotiations can restart. Quite simply, we will have to wait until the mid-term elections in the United States are over in November before we can entertain the idea of a serious resumption in negotiations. I will be working to that end.
I am a new Commissioner and do not know what has happened in the past or what precedent has been set, but I feel instinctively that the information-sharing, consultation and dialogue I have with this Parliament and with the Committee on International Trade is very strong. It is certainly more wide-ranging and frequent and of greater depth than I was used to as a minister in my national parliament. I welcome the depth and strength of those contacts and am slightly surprised by the criticism that has been expressed. I do not know whether it is one representative of Parliament or of the Committee on International Trade as a whole, and I hope it is not.
The Commission consults Parliament on all main trade policy orientations on the basis of the Westerterp Procedure which, as we know, provides for the possibility of a debate in Parliament before the opening of negotiations on any trade agreement, as well as for information from the Council before the conclusion of any such agreement. We do so also on the basis of the Stuttgart Declaration, which states that Parliament should be consulted on the conclusion of all agreements – even ones covered by the then Article 113 – that have an important bearing on the Community.
Our commitment to this relationship is shown by the fact that we send the Committee on International Trade copies of all the policy documents that are under discussion in the Council’s Article 133 Committee. There is no legal obligation on us to do this. We do it because it is right and because it helps underpin our relations. No doubt we could do even better in the future, but to characterise what we do at the moment as ‘poor’ or ‘insufficient’ seems inaccurate.
A number of the points raised relate to legitimate concerns over the impact of these negotiations – both their direction and suspension – on developing countries. I should make it clear that developing countries do not conform to a ‘standard size’ state of development or set of interests when it comes to the negotiations. There are different developing countries with very different interests and very different needs. Our job is primarily to ensure two things: firstly, that all developing countries benefit and gain from these negotiations and, secondly, that the weaker, more vulnerable and less-developed among them receive the greatest direct assistance, not least in terms of capacity-building, Aid for Trade and the putting in place of a full duty-free and quota-free system that enables them to access rich world markets.
In other words, we operate a system of proportionality: proportionality vis-à-vis what we expect developing countries to contribute and the effort we expect of them in bringing these negotiations to a conclusion, and proportionality also in terms of what we give and how we support and underpin their development. The countries that are in greatest need and have least to offer are quite rightly those which are, and will remain, our priority in these negotiations.
It is important to stress this because, unlike some of those who have spoken, I passionately believe that a good Doha deal can contribute to development and to fairer trade, through the way in which we operate special and differential treatment between developing countries, the way we allow carve-outs for commitments to developing countries to protect and enable the development of infant industry, the way we provide for longer implementation periods for developing countries so that they can prepare for change and, in particular, the way that we grant special access to the least-developed countries and attention to their capacity needs. We shall continue to adhere to that standard, as you would expect us to do, throughout the negotiations.
What is important is to have not just access for developing countries to the markets of the developed world, but also much greater access for developing countries to the markets of other developing countries. What is important is South-South trade, especially given the extent of duty-free and quota-free access that we in Europe already give to developing countries and particularly the ACP countries, as a result of which 75% of agricultural exports from Africa come to Europe, as do 45% of those from Latin America. In fact, we are the most open and fair-minded trading bloc in the world. Let us remember that fact, whilst also reminding ourselves of what we can do better in the future. The greatest and earliest gains for developing countries will come from increased trade opportunities with other developing countries. It is therefore South-South trade that we must not lose sight of when delicately and sensitively addressing the issues of tariff reductions and the much-needed multilateralisation of ‘Everything But Arms’.
Others who have spoken have suggested that far from giving too little for and to developing countries, the European negotiating position has consisted of giving far too much, too early and showing far too much flexibility. Well, we in Europe conceived the Doha Round. We were primarily instrumental in launching it and we have nurtured it throughout. After Cancún we were instrumental in putting it back on track, through the framework agreement, in 2004, and I do not apologise for putting an end date, in Hong Kong, on the elimination of our export subsidies. This was a commitment we had already made, assuming, of course, that we reach the end of these negotiations and that other countries act similarly in eliminating the components of their export subsidisation. I make no apology, and am not actually primarily responsible for the future of the common agricultural policy, although I would point out that I do not as yet see a consensus emerging in favour of its abolition."@en1
|
| lpv:unclassifiedMetadata |
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples