Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2006-07-05-Speech-3-323"
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"en.20060705.21.3-323"2
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".
Mr President, I suspect that there was a plot in this House in scheduling this debate right now, because it was expected that this would be the time at which England would have been playing against France. Mr Daul and I, having been involved in these negotiations, felt we were the victims of this plot. But, as we know, England did not qualify, so perhaps it matters somewhat less – at least for me.
We therefore do not need to use sunset clauses. The agreement reflects that – in that we acknowledge that the principles of good legislation mean that powers should be delegated without a sunset clause, without a time limit. But the principle that the legislature should, if necessary, be able to set a sunset clause – that is a power we have under the Treaty – is recognised to the extent that the agreement says very clearly ‘without prejudice to the rights of the legislative authority’. As is said, we do have the right, but I believe that we will not need to use it except perhaps in exceptional circumstances that we cannot foresee at present. We recognised that
as part of the negotiations, because the other institutions felt very strongly about it, but also, in my opinion, because as a parliament we realised that we will not need to do so.
With this agreement we should be more relaxed about delegating matters to the Commission because we will have that control afterwards. We have the ludicrous situation in our Union where we sometimes have two or three readings on subjects such as the width of tyres for tractors, which in any national context would have been delegated to the government to deal with – this is because we have been reluctant to delegate. With the assurance that we can control what we delegate, there is no reason for us not to delegate much more and more frequently. That is another reason for welcoming this agreement.
That is why my group and our committee, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, rejected the amendments to which the Commissioner referred. It is only a recital – Parliament is not reaffirming the resolution to which it refers – but I do not see the need for a reference. My group – and I think other groups too – may be voting against this amendment if it is indeed confirmed by the group that tabled it. I will be listening to other speakers with interest in a minute.
There is a remaining issue: the adaptation of existing legislation. Commissioner Wallström referred to the package of 25 measures that will be adapted urgently, with a proposal by the end of this year. Beyond that the Commission has undertaken to carry out a survey of all existing legislation to see what needs to be adapted and will make a proposal. But we have no undertaking from the Council to act within any given timetable, so we as a Parliament will have to watch that very carefully. We have a ceasefire. I do not want to break the ceasefire, but we will have to watch very carefully that the Council looks at this seriously within the necessary timetable. So this may not be completely the end of the story, but nonetheless I think it is a huge breakthrough, a huge advance for Parliament.
I would like to finish in the way that Commissioner Wallström began, which is to thank all those involved. Certainly my thanks are due to the Commission. Its position is completely different to the Commission’s position of a few years ago and I think Commissioner Wallström can take much of the credit for that. The Commission has moved to a position where it was very supportive of our position. I think our positions were virtually identical for most of these negotiations.
I would like to thank the British and the Austrian Presidencies: the British Presidency that initiated the resumption of the Council’s consideration of this matter, the Austrian Presidency that took it forward so ably. Of course I would like to thank my fellow negotiator, Mr Daul, the Chairman of the Conference of Committee Chairmen. We went through many meetings together over a six-month period. I am very glad that tonight I can report to this packed House – at least those Members who are not watching the football! – that we have a very important result which I think is not just good for this Parliament, but is actually good for our Union.
We have before us technically two reports for procedural reasons, but they concern a single package: the proposed revision of the 1999 Council decision on comitology and the joint declarations which, because they constitute a sort of interinstitutional agreement, are subject to a separate report. They are globally a package and together they represent a huge step forward for Parliament – a major transformation of the comitology system.
My constituents back home in Yorkshire would be asking me what comitology is. It is not exactly the subject they are talking about day in, day out in the pubs and clubs of Yorkshire. Every legislature has a system of delegating powers to the executive. In national parliaments that is typically legislation that confers on the government powers to adopt further measures: the statutory instrument in the UK, the
in Belgium, decrees in various other countries. The systems change slightly, but it is quite normal to confer powers on the executive, not least to deal with technical details and complex matters once the main legislation has laid down the general principles.
What is unusual in our system in the European Union is that, when we confer such powers on the Commission, we oblige it to act in conjunction with a committee of national civil servants. In many cases those committees have the power to block the Commission and refer the matter back to the Council. We have always found that objectionable: firstly because only committees of national civil servants and not Parliament have the right to scrutinise the Commission and refer questions back, and secondly because matters are referred back only to one branch of the legislative authority – the Council – even when the basic act has been adopted under codecision.
We also found the system to be thoroughly untransparent and complex with the numerous committees that give rise to the name of comitology. Only an expert could study it and understand it.
Over the years we have obtained small concessions. We now receive every document that is sent to a comitology committee. Since 1999 we have had some power to object within a certain time limit if we think that a measure goes beyond the powers that have been delegated. However, up to now, our fundamental objections have been unanswered. With this agreement there is a transformation of the situation: henceforth Parliament will be able to say no to any implementing measure of a quasi-legislative nature adopted through the comitology system, and if we say no the measure cannot be enacted. The Commission will either have to put forward a new proposal or table new legislation under the codecision procedure. That is a huge step forward for Parliament – and not just for Parliament – in terms of the accountability and transparency of the whole Union system. That is why this agreement is so important.
Nonetheless, there have been some issues with which we have been ill at ease and where we had to negotiate to ensure that our position was fully safeguarded. For instance, we have in this agreement a reference to the Lamfalussy
. Indeed, by mentioning it, as regards the Commission, we are actually upgrading that
from a mere statement in Parliament by the Commission President and a letter from the relevant Commissioner to the relevant committee chairman, to a declaration by the whole institution. So we have upgraded the relevant parts of the Lamfalussy
. That is also important.
We have gained satisfaction on time limits: it is an important step forward that three months can be extended to four, especially – as Commissioner Wallström pointed out – as the clock starts running once we get the text in all the languages. That will give us adequate time to consider these matters.
There has also been this issue of sunset clauses. I think that with this agreement Parliament will not normally need to use sunset clauses. We used them before, because when we delegated powers to the Commission we lost those powers for ever. With very loose control over how they were exercised, it was quite normal that we wanted to use sunset clauses as a way of reasserting control if need be. However, with this agreement we can say no to any implementing measures we dislike, even every single one of them, if we are dealing with quasi-legislative measures."@en1
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"arrêté royal"1
"de bonne foi"1
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