Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2006-07-04-Speech-2-040"
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"en.20060704.5.2-040"2
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".
Mr President, today’s debate sees the end of a 14—month-plus process of negotiation on general rules on drawing resources from the funds. What we have before us is a sensible compromise. What this means for the new Member States is a reduced need for cofinancing, which has rendered effective drawing of resources from the funds impossible. For example, this will mean a reduction of 15% for the Czech Republic. Private resources could become part of cofinancing. Non-recoverable value added tax will be an eligible cost and the absurd N+2 rule will at least for some time become N+3. Social housing projects that have a direct bearing on the environment will become an eligible cost for the funds. This sounds like the standard conditions that the original Members of the European Community made use of for decades. The ten new Member States, however, were denied them, perhaps in the hope that it would be possible to complicate even further the already difficult process of drawing EU resources, even though these resources formed part of the promise made in the accession conditions negotiations.
Fortunately for the new Member States, it is not only Parliament that is unfairly divided into new and old Member States; this also applies to the Council, which has incorporated this compromise into the new rules. If, however, we leave the Council solely responsible for drawing up reasonable compromises, we will become a superfluous institution, which will simply take advantage of the voting rights of individual delegations to push through rules that will disintegrate the EU still further. The long and, here in Parliament, fruitless 14-month negotiation process has only served to demonstrate how matters in the EU would turn out if we adopted the European Constitution with a majority decision, indeed a decision that is valid here. The majority here in Parliament from the original Member States would impose rules on the weak, the small, the poor and the new. A decision-making process favouring consensus and veto, leading to reasonable compromises in the Council, would be removed from the equation."@en1
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