Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2006-05-31-Speech-3-192"
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"en.20060531.18.3-192"2
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".
Mr President, we have before us the report on the enlargement of the euro zone. It is based on the Commission’s second report, which appraises the state of practical preparations and entry status of individual Member States. I should like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to Commissioner Almunia for the clarity of his report and of his stance, and I make a point of saying this because a year ago, during the review of the Stability and Growth Pact, I was rather inclined to think of the Commission as too compliant.
You have adopted a very clear position, and for that you have my wholehearted thanks. Following the debates in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and those conducted within political groups, as well as the agreements made amongst the groups, I am convinced that the Commission’s stance will be largely supported.
The euro has been successful across the board, since it has ensured monetary stability both within the euro zone, with low rates of inflation, and in relation to outside currencies. This is only possible if we observe not only the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty but also the Stability and Growth Pact. Given that the two largest states of the euro zone, France and Germany, have remained in contravention of the stability pact for years on end without finding the necessary inner strength to enact essential reforms, it is imperative that we, in this current phase involving the entry of Member States with a derogation, fulfil the conditions of the Maastricht Treaty to the letter.
We have twelve euro zone members and eleven states with a derogation; Britain and Denmark have a special ‘opt-out’ status. That is something else again, and they can always reconsider what they want to do. All the others are compelled to accept the supervision of their budgetary and financial policies and the appraisal of their level of convergence. The Commission has done these things carefully and rigorously, and for this, too, I offer my most sincere thanks.
The difference, which was not evident to all here in Parliament – even in discussions within the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs – is that, under the Regulations of 1997, both members of the euro zone and states with a derogation are subject to supervision of their budgetary and financial policies and to coordination of their economic policies. Within the euro zone this is achieved through stability programmes, while states with a derogation have convergence programmes.
This is why, after lengthy debates, we have adopted a report which is strongly guided by the Maastricht Treaty in terms of entry criteria, which are as follows: price stability; a candidate for entry must have a rate of inflation no more than 1.5% higher than that of the three best EU Member States. As regards public finances, the level of debt must not exceed 60% of GDP, with a 3% ceiling for new debts. I sometimes get the impression that the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact are being misinterpreted. And then we have the adherence to ERM II for two years, interest-rate convergence, legislative compatibility, an independent central bank and economic convergence. I am convinced that premature introduction of the euro is detrimental to the Member States, since real convergence and financial, economic and monetary stability are essential when determining the ultimate exchange rate so that an accession candidate, having entered and no longer being able to devalue or revalue, does not default.
We deliberated and agreed that countries would not be named, but that we wanted, on the other hand, to enter into discussions with the Commission and the European Central Bank on the setting of the rate of inflation, another area in which differences exist. The European Central Bank has defined a value close to 2% as price stability for the evaluation of its monetary policy, and we are keen to become fully involved in this dialogue.
We decided, moreover, that we do not wish any one of the candidate countries to be given special rebates, but that we place great value on equal and proper treatment for all, be they new or old Members. We also do not wish the experience of the first accession phase, involving the entry of Greece on the basis of incomplete data and Italy before completion of two years’ compliance with the ERM fluctuation margins, to be taken as a precedent for the enlargement of the euro zone; we wish instead to encourage the Commission to be impartial and true to the Maastricht Treaty in the assessments it delivers. You will appreciate, Commissioner, that our wish is for greater transparency. I am grateful for the constructive cooperation of my fellow Members. In the end, I feel that the report we have developed and refined is a good one which will have the support of the vast majority of my colleagues here and which in turn emphatically endorses the Commissioner’s stance."@en1
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