Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2006-04-05-Speech-3-152"
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"en.20060405.17.3-152"2
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".
Mr President, the agitation that had preceded the Palestinian and Israeli elections is subsiding, and the situation is clearer.
We find ourselves faced with new parties, new actors and new difficulties, but perhaps also faced with hope. Both the Palestinians and the Israelis want an end to the conflict and feel the urgent need to fight against poverty. This equation is not bad after all, and if the European Union wants to play a part in it, then it must tackle three problems.
Firstly, it must support Palestine financially, and that includes not only the basic needs, but also the public services that are on the verge of collapse. In Gaza, where 35% of workers are employed by the Palestinian Authority and where 75% of Palestinians live below the poverty line, famine is starting to become rife, employees are no longer being paid and, according to official sources, avian influenza could combine with human influenza and give rise to the dreaded pandemic. This support for the public services cannot, however, take the form of support for an unofficial presidential administration that would set itself up more or less as an opposition force.
Secondly, the European Union must hold talks with Hamas, under certain conditions, certainly, but it must hold talks. Mr Carter had already as good as said this back in January, and Mr Clinton recently affirmed it. For all those who remember the many terrorist movements that have become respectable political parties, but also for all those who want peace and who respect the electoral choice of nearly half of the Palestinian population, it is vital that we begin talks and it is vital that we open negotiations. Hamas is abiding by its truce, and its Foreign Affairs Minister has just, to everyone’s surprise, I admit, half-opened a door by not excluding a two-State solution. Let us seize this opportunity. The idea of backtracking and of acknowledging the State of Israel on the basis of the 1967 borders is already, in itself, a negotiation, because it implies that Israel itself recognises this drawing from 1967.
Thirdly, the European Union must obtain a guarantee from the Israeli Government that the unilateral disengagement plan is only a plan B and not a plan A. It is true that it is more difficult to negotiate peace than to ensure a reasonable level of security for oneself by unilateral and forceful means. If, however, the unilateral convergence plan turns into Israel’s secret programme, then that will mean not only the end of the road map and of any bilateral initiative, but also the end of any hopes of peace, and Europe will lose any credible influence it has in that part of the world.
There you have three problems requiring solutions, but I have seen that you have already grasped the main lines of action in relation to this."@en1
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