Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2006-01-17-Speech-2-269"

PredicateValue (sorted: default)
rdf:type
dcterms:Date
dcterms:Is Part Of
dcterms:Language
lpv:document identification number
"en.20060117.21.2-269"2
lpv:hasSubsequent
lpv:speaker
lpv:spoken text
". Thank you for the question. There are strong reasons for concern about the situation in Sri Lanka. The year 2005 was a bad one for the peace process. The assassination of Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, the electoral boycott enforced by the LTTE in the north and east, and the numerous killings in the east and in Jaffna have put the ceasefire in jeopardy. The failure of the post-tsunami operations management structure, the mechanism within which the government, the LTTE and Muslim representatives were to decide jointly about tsunami reconstruction in the north and east, has also been a heavy drawback, creating huge resentment among the Tamils. What we are seeing now is a dangerous spiral. The Sri Lankan military has now lost more than 60 soldiers in indirect attacks by the LTTE in Jaffna and other parts of the north and east. So far, the government has acted with a remarkable sense of restraint, but this cannot last forever. The European Union, and the Commission in particular, plays a strong part in the peace process. Sri Lanka is a personal priority of the Commissioner responsible for external relations, Mrs Ferrero-Waldner. She went there last March and fought hard to obtain an agreement on P-TOMS. She still feels this would have made a major difference. The EU passed strong messages to both sides throughout the year. In particular, the EU declaration of September 2005 announcing that high-level delegations of the LTTE would no longer be received in EU capitals was a major signal that, while seeking a balanced approach to the conflict, the EU would not tolerate further violence from the LTTE. The Commission has also been instrumental in raising the profile of the co-chairs. The Commissioner responsible for external relations personally attended three of the four co-chair meetings held in 2005. Indeed, two of them were held in Brussels. The Commission continued to support Norway’s facilitation through public, as well as private, messages throughout the year. The Commission also supported the idea that the next co-chair meeting should take place in Sri Lanka close to the fourth anniversary of the ceasefire agreement. The Commission will intensify its efforts into the next year. Two priorities have been set for the Commission’s action. Firstly, the Commission will work towards an even stronger role for the co-chairs, including direct visits at ministerial level. The Commissioner responsible for external relations herself intends to return there in February, hopefully with all the co-chairs. She wants to be able to speak to Mr Pirapaharan in person and pass him the direct message that Europe will react very soon if the LTTE shows no sign of change. Secondly, now that P-TOMS have failed, the Commission is working on an alternative base to deliver reconstruction to the north and east. It may seek to work more locally, say in one or two districts, to compensate for the absence of a larger consensus between the key players."@en1
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata

Named graphs describing this resource:

1http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/English.ttl.gz
2http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/Events_and_structure.ttl.gz

The resource appears as object in 2 triples

Context graph