Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-07-05-Speech-2-300"
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"en.20050705.31.2-300"2
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".
Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from and to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident.
In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list.
In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria.
It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives.
Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment.
As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments.
Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@en1
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