Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-06-08-Speech-3-287"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20050608.21.3-287"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spokenAs | |
| lpv:translated text |
".
Mr President, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to start by thanking those present for their excellent cooperation over recent years and during the preparation of the reports which we are debating here today. I intend to divide my comments into two parts. I have a few words to say on the Stability and Growth Pact, after which I shall turn my attention to the two regulations.
I should like to comment first on the regulation on the preventative aspects, in respect of which our committee made two central demands. Firstly, we want the quality of statistics to be improved; although Greece is not the only example of this, it is one with which we are all familiar. We feel that the quality of statistics at national and Community level must be ensured in order to guarantee the independence, integrity and accountability of both national statistical offices and Eurostat.
Secondly, we want the Commission not only to accept statistics, but also to conduct the dialogue in the Member State with the acting persons and institutions for the purpose of analysing the situation. We want stronger cooperation with the European Central Bank, because we cannot have a situation in which two different statistics are audited even though they are not comparable and possible contradictions result in questions from the Commission to the Member State. This cooperation, these comparisons, this interpretation and questions of cooperation between the European Central Bank and the Commission during the evaluation and comparison of statistics is important for us.
Secondly, we want medium-term budgetary objectives to be reviewed at least annually rather than regularly and for the general government debt ratio to be taken into account. For Regulation No 1467/97 on the excessive deficit procedure, we want a clear definition of exceptional factors, because the interpretation is too broad here and there is too little transparency. We want minimum European standards for budgetary planning to be created. The Commission should specify the parameters to the Member States, including for more uniform growth forecasting. We want the maximum deadline for regaining targets to be limited to three years from when the deficit occurred. We are also of the opinion that we need a specific list of relevant factors to be taken into account in the deficit procedure.
We accept the proposal as it stands. We want to make it more specific, accountable and credible and to reduce the margin for interpretation, so that it is easier to guarantee compliance, and we want to use these two regulations to give the Pact more credibility, win back confidence in it and hence respond to uncertainty among the people about the degree of seriousness with which European decisions are addressed.
I see the approach taken by many of those in public office to the Stability and Growth Pact, which was included in the Treaty and signed in Amsterdam in 1997, as a clear example of the double standards of numerous politicians and the double game they play between domestic policy and Brussels. Unfortunately, it sometimes had to be used in the past as an excuse for the purpose of making popular statements at home, rather than being used to safeguard, in a spirit of solidarity, the acceptance of responsibility in the European Union.
I do not see the Stability and Growth Pact as an onerous duty or laborious task imposed by the European Union; on the contrary, it is a necessary coordination framework for national budgetary policy within the framework of monetary union, in which, while monetary policy is centralised, budgetary policy is a national matter. However, one thing is certain: the incentive structures for budgetary policy have changed with monetary union. Before, the penalties of the financial markets were clearer and stronger. If, for example, Italy pursued a shaky budgetary policy, interest on the financial markets rose instantly in anticipation of devaluation. Now governments do not have such a clear idea of what the financial markets make of poor budgetary policy. The continually criticised penalties and sanctions at the end of a long process therefore make sense, as the financial markets no longer have their previous powers.
Another point is that, unfortunately, it is not possible in monetary union to avoid one’s dues and pursue a budgetary policy with no sense of solidarity. That is why coordination is needed, in order to relieve the burden on monetary policy as a whole and make sure that interest rates stay low. It is for me beyond question that there should be a framework for budgetary policy in the Member States in monetary union, including for the purpose of preventing excessive debt and guaranteeing monetary stability.
In my view, the Stability Pact has a persistent design fault which, unfortunately, we cannot repair because it is in the Treaty. Unfortunately, the sinners can stand in judgment and, as they have done in the past, disregard what the Commission proposes in its capacity as guardian of the Treaties. This has led to a loss of trust and credibility and has, at times, been an expression of action with no sense of solidarity. Nonetheless, the euro is a success, as is the Stability and Growth Pact, for, without it, we would not have had the debates on the causes of deficit and the objectives of budgetary policy. It is also the basis of today's debate and the basis for the necessary reforms and adjustments being made.
I think it is a good thing that there is this framework, because it allows us to talk about deficits, the causes of deficits and the effects of deficits more intensively and in all openness. The public have more confidence in the euro than in many of the European Union’s other political projects.
However, the subject of today's debate is not the Stability Pact per se; it is the Commission's two proposals for regulations based on the decision taken by the European Council of 22 and 23 March. Both the majority in committee and I as rapporteur have taken note of the Council conclusions; we do not question these decisions, but we do judge these two proposals for regulations on the basis of principles and statements.
Our aim in our evaluation of the proposals for resolutions, was to bring about greater transparency, define rather than interpret and implement rather than avoid the decisions promised. We want greater transparency and better definitions.
Different procedures apply to these two regulations. Regulation No 1466/97 on the preventative aspects is governed by the cooperation procedure, while Regulation No 1467/97 on the excessive deficit procedure is governed by the consultation procedure with the Commission and the Council."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples