Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-05-25-Speech-3-236"
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"en.20050525.23.3-236"2
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".
Madam President, I will avoid making this a purely Dutch discussion, and speak in English so that others can participate directly in this interesting debate.
It is regrettable that this debate is being held at such a late hour, but I thank the Commissioners for being here and wish Mr McCreevy, who was supposed to be here, all the best with his health. I also hope, of course, that we can continue the debate in the committee.
The possibility of a takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse or Euronext has ignited debates in the European Parliament over whether such a takeover can be assessed at national level alone. At present, the two cases are being dealt with by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in the UK. Legally speaking, the takeover of the LSE may be the responsibility of the relevant Member State’s competition authorities, since European competition rules do not apply as long as the national regulators deem the relevant markets to be their respective Member States and the turnover level to be below the thresholds set for European competition rules to apply.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has tabled this oral question to the Commission to ask it to play a more proactive role. We would like the Commission to consider the different scenarios that might arise and assess the effects that they might bring to competition in, and the pricing of, listing services, trading services, information services and, not least, important post
trade services, clearing and settlement.
We are aware of the detailed studies undertaken by the Competition Commission in the UK, prepared by the British Office of Fair Trading. The standpoint of that assessment is, however, primarily or maybe even exclusively the impact for the UK markets, and we would like to see that broadened in the Commission’s assessment.
You may remember the shock caused in 2002
2003 when some traders in Dutch blue
chip equities challenged Euronext Amsterdam to lower prices and to providing improvements in services, by looking for an alternative trading venue with Deutsche Börse and the LSE. This showed that competition really makes a difference. This characterises the situation we have at present of an open integrated European market with crossborder competition. The question is whether different scenarios increase this competitive tendency, or go in the opposite direction and tend to create monopolies
situations for which, by the way
competition regulation might be a more appropriate answer.
Another related issue is the aspect of regulation and supervision. From the moment the possible take
over of the LSE appeared on the pages of the financial papers, speculation started as to where the headquarters of the merged entity would be based and which regulator would get the power to supervise it. That was more than speculation. I tend to believe there was truth in the stories that the issue of the regulatory regime was a major subject in the merger talks. Who knows, it might even have been part of the background of the rebellion against the Deutsche Börse leadership, which you in Germany have such nice nicknames for.
As the rapporteur of subsequent reports on prudential supervision and the FSAP, I would not dare to express my preferences for one or other national regulatory regimes. My far greater concern is that there will be counterproductive competition between national regimes, instead of further coordination and cooperation. That is one of my strongest arguments for a European level supervisor. In the reports I prepared in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, and which were adopted in the previous plenary sitting, this is again stressed as an option for the near future.
Such a European level supervisor should execute the application of the European regulatory framework of the FSAP developed in previous years. As regards the part of the financial market which is already supranational and operates crossborder and often cross
sector, one of our main messages is to create real convergence in the implementation of the European directives and real convergence of supervisory practice, thereby avoiding regulatory arbitrage and possible competition on other factors for establishment such as fiscal and cost aspects.
Therefore, the possible effects of the Commission’s ambitions as regards integration of the financial markets and the regulation and supervision of different scenarios should also be part of the assessment we are asking for. In that context I would ask you to focus your attention on scenarios in which merger activity is not restricted to EU countries alone. There may also be conceivable scenarios in which the New York stock exchange and a newly formed one joint with the LSE or, on the other hand Euronext and Deutsche Börse might get together. There might then be a disintegration rather than a further convergence of European regulations. This should also be taken into account in your assessment and expectations."@en1
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