Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-05-10-Speech-2-204"
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"en.20050510.23.2-204"2
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"Mr President, I believe it has been repeated often enough. It is obvious that preventing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a European Union priority objective. Equally obviously, it must also be a priority objective of the Member States.
It is particularly regrettable that the European code of conduct is not binding. At any rate, it is not binding in every country, and I can tell you from personal experience that it only takes one country to refuse an export licence and other European countries are quick to present themselves as candidates to fill the unplaced order. We should not deceive ourselves. In my country, for example, the law now makes provision for this scenario, and there is normally a requirement, but obviously it needs to become the norm. Also, even if we had a binding code, that does not mean that the European Union’s outside competitors would abide by it. Having said that, I am of course the first to want to make such a code mandatory.
There are three considerations I would like to mention. First, traceability is a very important aspect, since it enables us to trace back the entire route the arm has taken. I would also like to draw your attention to a new perspective that may be interesting. Research is being carried out in Europe today, not only to ensure that the arm can be traced, but even to disable it remotely. Research in this area is already well advanced and I believe we should support initiatives of this kind.
I would also like to mention a number of projects and actions being conducted by several of our Member States. Some of them, for example, are suggesting to populations who own weapons and are prepared to hand them in that they might exchange those weapons for bicycles. I can tell you that this is the kind of action we should also be encouraging in Africa.
Another consideration is this. I am quite familiar with the African problem and I can assure you that it is not the European Union that is supplying the largest number of small arms to Africa. I accept that we must show the way and that we must even beat our breasts from time to time, but all the same we should not end up believing that all those arms came from the European Union. Most of those arms do not come from the European Union, they come from other countries and in particular from the unused leftovers of certain armies. I could name some countries, but I will not. But it is obvious that some know, and that they know very well, whom I am talking about. That is therefore nevertheless a very important factor.
Regarding the treaty on the arms trade, which introduces compulsory national-based approvals for all international arms transfers and puts in place effective machinery for permits and licences, we do of course support such measures and I hope that in a few months’ time we will have made that kind of progress.
The explicit restrictions on arms transfers where there is a breach of obligations under international law, in the case, for example, of breaches of UN arms embargos, of customary law, of international treaties between the contracting parties or where there is a failure to observe international prohibitions on certain weapons, such as anti-personnel land mines, the restrictions, too, on transfers based on use where, for example, it is brought to a contracting party’s notice that the arms being transferred are likely to be used in complete violation of international humanitarian law or of human rights for the commission of genocide or crimes against humanity. These restrictions are all manifestly important aspects of this treaty.
However, the present text remains very vague in a number of areas. Its main purpose is to get a sufficient number of governments to agree on the principle of an international legal instrument on arms transfers. The NGOs are trying to create some momentum around the idea of a treaty before tackling the details. The treaty has been conceived as a framework convention that may be added to by protocols concerning, among other things, arms brokering or manufacture under licence. As always in such cases, however, maximum pressure will be required to get all states to subscribe to it, because if it is always the same States which subscribe and the same other States which do not, discouragement is bound to set in.
Finally, given that reference has been made to my personal experience, I would like to end by saying that it is sometimes difficult to judge whether an arms export licence should be granted or not. In fact, in some cases, Mr Staes, where, for example, the army or police of a country that is perhaps not necessarily a democracy asks for access to arms or to buy them and that same government, that same country, is faced with really very dangerous rebels who, for example, make use of human shields when attacking police stations or schools, it is extremely difficult, as a responsible politician, to make a choice. What I am really trying to say is that you never have the choice between a good and a bad solution, you always have the choice between two bad solutions. I do know what you are referring to and I can assure you, to answer your question, that if I had my time over again I would take exactly the same decision, because in my heart of hearts I do believe that was the decision I had to take."@en1
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