Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-04-13-Speech-3-063"

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"Mr President, at the end of this debate, which has largely been very disorganised, I would like to clarify certain points. The idea that it only needs a peremptory shout from Berlin or a clear signal from Paris to make the other twenty-three governments knuckle under is a totally un-European perception and contradicts the constantly recurrent need to achieve a viable working relationship in Europe and find compromise solutions. I do not want to have to ask myself how serious the criticism here in this House would have been, had we failed with Lisbon, had we failed to achieve the balances of which your House reminds us or had we failed totally with the reform of the Stability Pact. Some take the view that the old Stability Pact was so good that it did not need to be changed. However, this view is shared by not one government of the 25 Member States. The idea that the 25 Heads of State or Government and the 25 Ministers for Finance have put themselves on course for deficit and spiralling debt is a perfectly bizarre idea which I should like to vigorously contradict. Apart from that, Mr President, a lot has been said about the credibility of Europe. I believe that it is sometimes very much under threat and I have not entirely understood Mr Watson’s point. I was not sure whether he was addressing me or addressing a group of Member States. I hope you are not reproaching me for not having persuaded the Members of the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats to take the same position on all the issues, because I do not represent the PPE-DE here. I represent the European Council. To those people who have drawn everybody’s attention to Europe’s lack of credibility, I will say this: I would like very warmly to thank the Members who have been attending this debate since 9 a.m. this morning. The visitors to the European Parliament today have been surprised not to see more people at a time when Europe is debating some essential issues. I am pleased that, with regard to the decisions of the European Council on the Lisbon Strategy, there has been very little controversy. That seems to me entirely normal, coherent and logical, since and some people would do very well to read it the European Parliament's resolution that has been adopted on the Lisbon Strategy has been almost entirely reflected in the European Council's conclusions. The fact that certain elements are being criticised today would suggest that you are taking a highly self-critical approach. That is my observation! Furthermore, I believe that it is essential that we at least give the European Council's decision on the Lisbon Strategy credit for having placed great responsibility on the shoulders of the Member States. We were in considerable agreement in January when we debated the issue, stating that it falls to the national governments to make a success of the Lisbon Strategy not just for each of their countries but for Europe as a whole. From now on, the national governments will have to consult their national parliaments on their national reform programmes, the Council will be answerable to the European Parliament, and the Commission will play the role it has always had, that is to say the role of facilitator and initiator, a role that consists of uniting all the Member States in a spirit conducive to achieving the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy, which has been designed to ensure that, in the future, the European social model remains accessible to the greatest possible number of Europeans. I would note that, within certain groups that are rather more ecumenical than catholic, there are entirely divergent views on the essential elements of the form political action should take at European level. It is easier, Mr Radwan, to reach a compromise on the Stability and Growth Pact than to achieve coherence within the group to which you belong. I have witnessed this today and yesterday. On the Stability Pact, I should like to say that I am most surprised that all the interim stages of the reform of the Stability Pact have been accompanied by the same ferocious rhetoric and commentary on it. When a number of governments suggested that entire expenditure blocks should be written out of the Stability Pact, the criticism sounded exactly as it sounds now, now that it has not come to pass. Something must be wrong. The preventive part of the pact has been substantially strengthened. Why was this necessary? It was necessary because this aspect was simply – and quite criminally – neglected by the old pact – with the gestation of which I had a great deal to do. A number of governments also failed in so-called good times to follow the right policy for reducing deficits and debt. That may of course take a turn for the better following a number of forthcoming elections, although I seriously doubt it. The corrective part of the pact has only undergone minor changes, compared with what the Treaty and the Stability Pact say on the matter. Of course, if you imagined that, for the purpose of the pact, 3.0% really meant 3.0%, that proceedings would be instituted against countries with a deficit of over 3.0% and that these countries would be subject to sanctions if they did not get below the 3.0% limit the following year, then the reform of the Stability Pact does not come up to expectations. That would have required considerable amendments to the Treaty and, as a result, we would no longer have been able to use the old Stability Pact as a guide in important areas. The Treaty does not say that any deficit over 3.0% is an excessive deficit. Anyone who says so is misinterpreting the Treaty. It simply does not say that in the Treaty and I cannot accept that we should act as if it did and that those who are again finding their way back to a correct interpretation of the Treaty are now being treated like stability sinners. How can one take it upon oneself to claim sole responsibility for interpreting the Treaty and the Stability Pact? I read – and it even amuses me somewhat – that the Council, the 25 Ministers for Finance, the 25 Heads of State or Government, bowed down before Germany and France. This is completely ridiculous and, for the rest, offensive to the other twenty-three."@en1
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