Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-03-08-Speech-2-149"
Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
---|---|
rdf:type | |
dcterms:Date | |
dcterms:Is Part Of | |
dcterms:Language | |
lpv:document identification number |
"en.20050308.20.2-149"2
|
lpv:hasSubsequent | |
lpv:speaker | |
lpv:spokenAs | |
lpv:translated text |
".
Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, 2005 is going to be a decisive year in terms of whether nuclear disarmament is going to be achieved as a policy for peace; this primarily has to do with Iran and North Korea, but also with Pakistan, India, Israel, Europe and the USA. It will also be decisive as regards the thinking underpinning Europe’s security strategy. Let us establish security through effective multilateralism, that is, through international conventions such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the reinforcement of such international organisations as the IAEA or the UN. The May conference on review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has to face up to extremely pressing issues of global security, such as the states in crisis regions seeking to acquire atomic weapons, the black market in nuclear materials and the terrorist groups that are trying to get their hands on them.
It also has to be clear to us, though, that the commitments to disarm set down in this treaty have to be implemented, once and for all, by the states that possess nuclear weapons, for if they are not, these cannot claim with any credibility that they really do want to put a stop to proliferation.
I appeal to the European Union to assume an active role as a stakeholder, not only in the run-up to the conference, but also in its negotiations. This is a year in which we succeed or are lost. I appeal to the Council and the Commission, as a matter of urgency, to take a progressive line. We should be trying to put the El Baradei seven-point plan into practice. On issues such as the enrichment of uranium, there is a need for renewal. Signature of the supplementary protocol must become the norm. Secondly, violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be seen as endangering world peace and the sanctions imposed should reflect that.
I would like to say something about Iran, and the way the situation in the Middle East is developing. Europe cannot accept the prospect of Iran, one day, being in possession of nuclear weapons; what we expect of it is absolute transparency and cooperation with the EU, and with the IAEA as a guarantee of its renunciation of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration must be pro-active in supporting this, for only the Americans can make promises or carry out checks on whether economic sanctions should be relaxed. It should also be possible to discuss security issues with Iran’s interests in mind, and I urge the Council and the Commission to do so. Where Iran is concerned, I also urge that we have to take care not to dishonour or deny our values during these negotiations; human rights can never be negotiable. As regards North Korea, at this point I would simply appeal to them to return to the negotiating table, and the Commission should examine whether Europe should take on an active role in this respect.
It is precisely because our credibility is at stake that we need to ascertain whether it is indeed the case that the Americans have more atomic weapons based in Europe than they have stated. If they have, then that is a breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we demand their removal.
Finally, and very briefly, let me say something about ‘mini-nukes’. In historic terms, these are something quite different; they represent the abandonment of Cold War-style deterrence in favour of the active waging of war – a disaster waiting to happen."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples