Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-11-16-Speech-2-127"

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"en.20041116.12.2-127"2
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". Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@en1
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