Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-04-01-Speech-4-021"
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"en.20040401.2.4-021"2
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"Mr President, we have now reached the point in the debate on Turkey on which there is, fortunately, general unanimity about the remaining issues. These issues need to be tackled firmly, and implementation – the word has been dropped repeatedly – is necessary more than ever. Despite this, the current Oostlander report contains three weaknesses, and I believe that these ought to be eliminated first.
First of all, let us consider paragraph 8, according to which Turkey's current position in relation to the Cyprus conflict reflects the political power of the army. We surely cannot take this seriously. What has just happened in Cyprus now is that the army has endorsed the course of events according to the government. That is an example of reform and not of stagnation. We ought to remove this section from the report, something that Amendment No 10 makes possible.
Secondly, again in the light of recent events, surely Mr Oostlander cannot be serious when he states that the Greek Cypriots have demonstrated their firm commitment to the Annan plan? They will need to prove this in the next few weeks. I believe, then, that a change is needed on that score too.
Finally, the third weakness; I would be strongly in favour of lowering the voting threshold during the elections and have tabled an amendment to that effect. This is something Parliament wants, and we need to convey it to the Turks, because, as I see it, it would be preferable for the Turkish parliament to have a higher level of multiformity than it does at present, where a voting threshold of 10% is possible.
The main problem of the Oostlander report, however, lies in paragraph 7. The rapporteur has recognised, or perhaps had to recognise, that, if the current reforms take place, the Member States will inevitably decide in December to start the negotiations. What does paragraph 7 say on this? According to Mr Oostlander's interpretation, negotiations are inevitable, but we will not enter into real negotiations. In particular, the 31 chapters of the
will not form the subject of negotiations, although these negotiations have taken place with all other candidate Member States. What is being proposed in paragraph 7 is that we complete all the political criteria first. That sounds good, but what does it mean in practice?
Let me give an example; the same paragraph states that the programme should contain the drafting of a new Constitution. Mr Oostlander is in favour of this, and so am I. If this is done in a proper manner, it will, I think, take between two and three years; we need only look at how long the European Union is taking. To take another example, Mr Oostlander has repeatedly stated that the change in mentality that we want is a lengthy process. Does he really believe that this should all be completed before we can discuss the chapters? Surely not. Does Parliament think, and does, for example, the Group of the Party of the European Socialists really believe, that we should enter negotiations with Turkey with one arm tied behind our backs, because there are 31 chapters of the
that we are not allowed to discuss? My view, expressed in Amendment No 9, is different. I am in favour of doing two things after December.
Firstly, we ought to continue to underline the importance of the political criteria, if necessary by means of a special monitoring system, because that is important, now and in future, but at the same time, we should start the so-called normal negotiations. In my opinion, we cannot say to Turkey in December that we will start negotiations and follow Mr Oostlander's interpretation in this. This interpretation is now enshrined in paragraph 7 and it allows us only to do the groundwork for many years before we can enter the actual negotiations.
Paragraph 7 is now an imprecise – I would almost say diplomatic – compromise that covers a multitude of sins. The alternative is a clear, but balanced, position by Parliament, and to that Turkey is entitled."@en1
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