Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-04-01-Speech-4-009"
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"en.20040401.2.4-009"2
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".
Mr President, since my previous report, the Turkish Government has not been idle and has, with some determination, adopted a number of reforms in legislation. These mainly relate to human rights, freedoms in the areas of culture and media, and the curbing of the army's political role. We have been following the negotiations about Cyprus' future with much interest as they play a considerable part in Turkey’s progress towards the European Union.
Elements of the
are non-negotiable. This also applies to the values and the application thereof in the European Union. There is no room for negotiation. They must be embraced; if countries are really intent on becoming Member States, they must simply be adopted.
I do take the view, though, that the EU must hold on to the prospect of fully-fledged membership for Turkey once the political, economic and other criteria have actually been met. While it is understandable that some amendments should call for the close involvement of Parliament, it is just as necessary for us to do our homework in order to be able to assimilate the accession of countries to the European Union. That means that the results of the Convention will need to be accepted unreservedly; if they are not, we cannot function. The concept of deepening before enlarging still holds good.
The option of taking part in the Policy of Good Neighbourliness, as worded in Mr Napolitano's report, can also remain in place, but amendments affording Turkey a place outside of the European Union on its own, are not in keeping with the gist of my report. The categorical emphasis on the fulfilment of the political criteria is also tied in with the wish to find sufficient support among the people.
I hope that by accepting the outlines of this report, we will send a clear message to both the Turkish Government and society and to the citizens of the EU. This is very much a matter of principle, and no uncertainty can be tolerated. I suggest we continue the dialogue with Turkey with the open mind to which the Turkish Government has by now grown accustomed.
Initially, we imagined that it would be Turkish involvement in these negotiations that would cause difficulties, due to the army's opposition to a compromise and due to established administrators in the Turkish Government. Unfortunately, we have to note that Greek-Cypriot cooperation in finding a solution to the Cyprus issue is not optimal either, to put it mildly.
Needless to say, this is not the last we have heard on the matter. Negotiations are set to continue, because I cannot imagine the Greek-Cypriot Government risking joining the European Union on such extremely bad terms as these. I think it would not live this down for many years.
Despite all the changes on paper in Turkey and the decision in favour of departments to set civil society free, it appears that implementation of the reforms has been extremely difficult. The Government realises this too and has, by introducing a monitoring system, demonstrated that it means business. I see this as an important move on its part, because to us, it is mainly the implementation of all those changes that is essential. Paper can wait; the future will tell whether they will be realised.
The obstacles on the road to the European Union can hardly come as a surprise to us. The structure and philosophy of the state are reflected in the mentality of the population and government officials. If that is the reason why they are on a track that is not reconcilable with the European Union, they cannot expect this to change in the short term. The changes we want are revolutionary.
These observations bear out the report's basic idea. The European Union has to be strict in respect of all candidates, or states that want to become candidates, where the rule of law and democracy are concerned. That is, primarily, a matter of principle, but it is also about the EU's ability to function as such and about our ability to persuade our own people, whose acceptance of this enlargement will be dependent on our finding a basis for it.
What matters is that the candidates should fit in with the European Union in terms of the political values they uphold. Until such time as they do, they should not consider membership. This is not simply about correcting a number of specific abuses, but also about the legal and social basis from which abuses arise. For example, it is not simply about the release of Leyla Zana, who has been sentenced to many years' imprisonment for conduct for which she received the Sakharov Prize from this Parliament. What is important is that in future, such sentences should be unthinkable. If you question the highest courts in Turkey about this, to my astonishment, they are still unable to provide you with any answers.
The same applies to the cultural rights of minorities. It should be unthinkable that these should be obstructed in such a way that they cannot be exercised. A real separation of church and state should not give cause to panic, and neither should the freedom of religion for groups who are not specifically mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne. Apparently, this is a very difficult area for Turkey.
Another complex issue is the position of the army. Historically, one can appreciate that the army has enjoyed great trust among a large proportion of the population, but politics will need to regain its self-assurance. Although the government is working on changes, it cannot do much more than what circumstances permit. Nevertheless, the European Union should stick to the requirement that the army should have no more political influence than is customary in the EU Member States. In this light, I would discourage any amendments tending to water down what the European Union requires of Turkey. The Copenhagen political criteria must be fulfilled before we can move on to the usual support we offer with regard to the adoption of the
. That is a lesson we have learnt from previous enlargement processes and the experience we have had with Romania, for example. Moreover, it should also send a message to countries that are considering membership. I also think that the Turkish Government needs our pressure as back-up against the opposing forces in society and in parts of the corridors of power."@en1
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