Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-12-15-Speech-1-106"

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"en.20031215.9.1-106"2
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". Mr President, I wish to begin by thanking the rapporteur, Mr Manders, for his work on environmental liability. With regard to State subsidiary action, Amendments Nos 11, 13, 47, 59 and 60 require Member States to take remedial action in certain cases. The Commission’s view, after 13 months of difficult negotiations with the Member States, was that the time and conditions were not ripe for such an approach. It agreed consequently to amend its proposal. The common position leaves a wide measure of discretion to the Member States in deciding whether or not remedial action ought to be taken. This was a key point in achieving agreement among the Member States. The Commission will therefore not support those amendments. Concerning the so-called regulatory compliance and state-of-the-art or development risk issue, some amendments – Amendments Nos 9 and 16 – have been tabled that both seek to exclude from the scope of the directive damage caused by lawful events or which were scientifically unpredictable and to ensure that, under the same conditions, the operator will be entirely exonerated from any financial responsibility. The Commission stated on the occasion of the first reading that it considered that better specification of the scope of the so-called 'permit defence' would be useful, to avoid any suggestion that this might be tantamount to a 'blank cheque' to pollute. The Commission does not see that the alternative wording proposed by these two amendments would constitute a further improvement. Amendments Nos 48 and 61, for their part, seek to ensure that the liable operator will be entitled to invoke regulatory compliance and the unpredictable character of damage as mitigating factors. These amendments are acceptable in part and in principle insofar as their thrust goes closer to the current thinking on these issues, as it emerged from the debates that led to the adoption of the common position. Amendments Nos 52, 53, 57 and 58 seek to exclude from the scope of the directive good agricultural and forestry practice, as defined in some agro-environmental regulation. A total exclusion would be only warranted if the agro-environmental regulation ensured the same level of environmental protection as the liability directive. This does not seem to be the case. The Commission would rather see good agricultural and forestry practices as part of the circumstances which would lead to an attenuation of liability. Amendment No 17 seeks to impose proportional liability in case of damage caused by several parties. The Commission considers that Member States should retain the right to opt either for joint and several or proportional liability – or a mix of both – according to their national legal traditions. With respect to biotechnology, Amendments Nos 43, 44, 54 and 55 require the Commission to present a proposal to supplement the regulatory framework on liability for economic damage caused by genetically modified organisms. The issue of economic damage to conventional and organic farmers has been discussed and is still being discussed in the context of the so-called 'co-existence' debate. Insofar as this type of damage represents damage which has traditionally been dealt with by national civil liability laws, it is by no means clear whether Community action is necessary and would show such an added value as being justified under the subsidiarity principle. I believe that the outcome of that debate should not be prejudged here. On the question of financial security, Amendments Nos 22 and 49 require the Commission to submit proposals for a harmonised compulsory financial guarantee, should no appropriate instruments or markets for insurance or other forms of financial security have developed on their own. The process of getting the proposal this far has not been an easy one, as Mr Manders has already said. It took a long time to develop the proposal and the subsequent discussions have demonstrated a great diversity of opinion in the Council and Parliament. With the overall goals of the proposal in mind, the Commission has shown flexibility in helping a balanced compromise to be achieved within the Council. Everybody is convinced of the important role that financial security, including but not limited to insurance, can play in the implementation of the directive. Member States and market operators, as well as the Commission, will have an important role to play in encouraging a timely emergence of financial assurance systems, products and markets to that effect. Having said this, it is clear to me that Member States should have the possibility to develop financial assurance solutions at their own pace which are well adapted to their own needs and institutional conditions. It would be particularly difficult to adopt rules mandating financial security when the economic operators most knowledgeable and economically interested in developing such products have been unable to do so. The Commission is therefore not in a position to support the amendment on financial security. It is certainly willing, however, to encourage initiatives whereby further impetus should be given to the market and all financial security providers to develop financial security products that would meet the new demand resulting from the adoption of the directive and the fact that operators will now be exposed to liability. Finally, on the issue of the extent to which damage should be remedied, there is general agreement that the polluter-pays principle should imply for the liable operator, as for the polluter, payment of all damage caused to the environment. In addition, there is a clear need to have a common understanding, within the Community, of the costs of environmental damage to be borne by the polluter. Furthermore, the rules set out in the proposal specify the full range of remediation actions to be carried out by the operator liable. Amendments Nos 31 to 36 narrow down the scope of damage remediation by suppressing the remediation of interim losses, together with suppressing the concept of compensatory remedial measures. Deleting elements from this range of actions would inevitably result in the polluter not having to carry the full cost of the damage he has caused. Having said all that, the Commission can support either fully, in part or in principle several of the amendments proposed. Those amendments are: 4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 23, 27, 40, 48, 61 and 63. We all agree that we want ambitious and workable legislation. The Commission sees the common position as a minimum in this respect. Finding a balanced compromise will be difficult, but the Commission will do all it can to help achieve this. Finally, I wish to thank the rapporteur, Mr Manders, once more. This compromise enabled the overall goal of the proposal to be preserved. The common position aims to establish a Community framework whereby environmental damage would be prevented or remedied through a system of environmental liability. The main features of the liability regime itself have not been significantly altered except on one point, which is the very broad discretion that is now available to Member States when deciding to remedy or otherwise environmental damage for which no solvent polluter can be held liable. The amendments under consideration by the Parliament concern several key issues, on which I should like to comment. Firstly, it is proposed in Amendment No 6 that remedial measures in case of damage to habitats and species are only taken within designated Natura 2000 areas. This means in effect that the scope of the future directive would be restricted to the Natura 2000 network. The Commission cannot support an approach which would narrow the scope of the future directive even further than was agreed in the common position, which in itself was less comprehensive than the original Commission proposal. Conversely, the Commission does not believe it either justifiable or workable to expand strict liability to all occupational activities in the EU. It cannot therefore support Amendment No 45. The scope of the directive is also touched upon in Amendments Nos 41, 42, 50 and 51 seeking to ensure that the directive should apply in future when environmental damage caused by an incident involving nuclear activities is not remedied on the basis of the relevant international conventions. The directive would in a way 'complement' the international conventions. Regarding the proposed 'complementarity' approach, the Commission does not believe it can work since it would oblige Member States having ratified those conventions to denounce them. We believe, on the contrary, that the international liability regime for damage caused by nuclear activities should be preserved. It is true that environmental damage will only be covered by this international regime once the new protocol to the Paris and Brussels Conventions, recently negotiated under the auspices of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, enters into force. This protocol does not allow the EU to become a party to it. It thus falls to Member States to ratify this protocol so that it becomes applicable. I should also like to mention that the application of the relevant international conventions will be part of the review to be conducted by the Commission, as required by Article 18 of the draft directive."@en1
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