Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-12-15-Speech-1-086"
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"en.20031215.7.1-086"2
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"Mr President, a huge task has been carried out by a lot of people over many years. In spite of this, the compromise now before us is, in my view, unacceptable. The proposal would mean that vote differentiation in the matter of shares could be permitted to remain for a transitional period, as an exception to the general rule. Subsequently, a revision would take place, involving a review of the system of A and B shares and also of other forms of shareholding.
Many believe that this has rescued the Nordic system of shares with different voting values. Those who maintain that this is a good compromise fail, however, to appreciate the issue of principle surrounding whether the EU is entitled to interfere in how shareholders in private companies choose to organise themselves. I find it regrettable to see so many in this Parliament so casually accepting infringements of the right of ownership. No one mentions the crucial issue of the principle of respect for the right of ownership. It is the business of no one other than the shareholders themselves how they organise their shares. That is a basic prerequisite of the market economy.
If the compromise is approved, this means in practice that Parliament says it is acceptable to appropriate assets. If someone has bought a share with a higher voting value at market price, what right does the EU or any state then have quite simply to rob this person of this investment by saying that what he has paid for no longer has any value?
The Swedish Government maintains that this revision clause is a victory because the revision is to embrace more forms of shareholding than simply the system of shares with different voting values. That may be the case, but the Swedish Government no doubt knows as well as anyone else that, in five years’ time when the revision takes place, no one will either be able, or wish, to investigate the multiplicity of forms of shareholding that exist within the EU. Presumably, the discussion would, then too, be focused upon the system of A and B shares. The reason for that is simple. Different voting values are a clear and straightforward system. Unlike with most other systems of shareholding, it is very simple to see how many votes a type of share corresponds to, and it is at least as easy to see what the share is worth in the market. There are no pitfalls or secrets in this system.
The main aim of the new regulations governing takeover bids is that the EU should be an open market and that obstacles to takeovers should be removed. The fact is, however, that the number of takeovers in countries in which different voting values are applied is not in any way lower than the number in countries where this system is not permitted.
In summary, the proposal now before us is, in my opinion, unacceptable, for, in the first place, it infringes the right of ownership; secondly, does not respect agreements entered into; and, thirdly, identifies vote-differentiated shares as an obstacle to takeovers."@en1
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