Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-11-19-Speech-3-290"

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". Mr President, I should like to clarify three points in my report. The first point, and probably the most politically controversial, is the final status of Kosovo. That is a hot potato, which everyone, including Parliament, has preferred to avoid. Following various discussions in the region, but also with a large number of people here, I have concluded that it is no longer an option to wait any longer, thus delaying the definition of the final status. If you see what problems Kosovo has now, it becomes increasingly evident that, for example, the socio-economic problems can only be solved if Kosovo’s final status becomes clear. After all, many investors refuse to invest in Kosovo, because it is uncertain what status that country has. It is also becoming increasingly clear, sadly, that a process has been started in which the international community, once hailed as a liberator, is increasingly being regarded as an occupier. This is very close to my heart, because I believe that the work that was done there was sound. This is, however, the reality in Kosovo and I think that Parliament should also base its conclusions on this. It is the EU’s responsibility to take the lead to ensure that within a period of – as far as I am concerned – two years, there is clarity with regard to Kosovo’s final status. It is quite clear to me that this will be a difficult choice. I also think that the European Union need not make that choice yet, but the Kosovars do need to know that a decision will be taken on their status in two years’ time. I therefore have a double message to give to the Kosovars: we are prepared to give you clarity about your final status in two years’ time, but you have to prove to us that you are able to manage your country in a proper manner, that is to say in a manner that embraces a decent minorities policy, including respect for the borders as they currently stand. If the Kosovars are able to do this, I think that we should say that in two years’ time, we are prepared to take a decision on their final status. I should therefore like to ask the Commissioner whether he can confirm once again what the Commission has already said in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, namely that the European Commission is pleased about – and, as such, is in agreement with – the fact that the European Union is taking the lead in drafting a roadmap, a timeframe – whatever you want to call it – as long as it becomes clear at the end of it what is going to happen with Kosovo. My second point is about Serbia and Montenegro. I think that two years ago, Mr Solana had good reasons for trying to keep those two countries together. That was necessary then to avoid chaos in the region. Two years have now passed and after trying for one year, those countries have another two years to try to see whether things work out. I think that now, the conclusion can, and should, be drawn that it is not working. Nobody, neither in Montenegro, nor in Serbia, is prepared to invest in this new federation, in these new structures. I think it is therefore appropriate for the European Union to say: we will no longer try to force you into something that neither of you want. We will adopt a neutral position. We will leave it up to you to decide, which also means that if we spend our money in Montenegro or Serbia, we will spend it on areas that need to be improved anyway. There are many of those areas, both in Montenegro and in Serbia, that need funding, irrespective of whether those countries become independent or carry on together. In conclusion, the final topic. Now that the committee has reached agreement on the above two points, the following point is now at risk of becoming the controversial point in plenary. It is about the fact that a number of countries in that region, three to be precise, have concluded a bilateral agreement with the United States to exclude American citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. It is very clear what the report states in this connection. We regret that Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania have concluded an agreement of that kind. In our view, this should not have happened. We applaud, however, the fact that Croatia has not concluded such an agreement. Moreover, it is laid down that ultimate EU membership of those countries at some point in the future is not compatible with such a bilateral agreement. Accordingly, my message to you is that you will need to discontinue those bilateral agreements in a few years’ time. However, does that now mean that we need to penalise Albania and Bosnia for concluding such an agreement? I would specifically address Mr Swoboda in this respect. He has tabled an amendment by means of which, in my view, he seeks to penalise Albania and Bosnia for making that mistake in the past. Indeed, he wants to rule out an agreement of any kind with those countries, as long as they have this agreement with the United States. Mr Swoboda, I think you have made a big mistake by saying this. Like you, I am angry with the United States for having forced those countries into concluding such an agreement, but I do not want to penalise the Albanians and Bosnians for that reason. In my opinion, we should not hold a competition here in Parliament about who is the biggest fan of the International Criminal Court. I would remind you that the NGO coalition in favour of the Criminal Court did not ask for this either, and to be honest, I think you are asking too much. What should matter to us is to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, our criticism of the United States and of those agreements, and, on the other, recognition that we also want to bring those countries closer to Europe in the next couple of years. We will need an agreement for this. We must not allow them to become the victim of pressure from the United States."@en1

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