Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-11-19-Speech-3-013"
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"en.20031119.1.3-013"2
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"Mr President, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, I think that yesterday's meeting made it clear that agreement by December is achievable. I say that because ultimately there are only a few issues that are really controversial, and they are unlikely to be resolved next year either. We should therefore encourage the Italian Presidency to maintain its present course and to stick as closely as possible to the text produced by the Convention, because that text represents a balance that would be hard to replicate. The same also very much applies to the document to be presented in the ministerial conclave next week. I believe that subject to that condition there is a chance of bringing the IGC to a successful conclusion.
Nevertheless, we need to recognise that opposing forces are still at work attempting to prevent this. That is something that we have already discussed here in connection with the Legislative Council. However, this House, too, has quite rightly taken a number of decisions this week about European budgetary rights, as you have pointed out, Mr President. In both cases – as regards the Legislative Council, which is to prevent any transparency and allow the national bureaucrats to carry on working as before, and as regards undermining Parliament's rights in relation to the budget – I am reminded of a series of films, the second of which is called "The Empire Strikes Back". The empire I am thinking of is the empire of national ministerial bureaucracies. In the third film in the series, good triumphs over evil, so there is a good chance that we can avert this danger. At the last but one meeting the Italian Presidency took the appropriate steps to safeguard our budgetary rights, and I hope that position will survive through to the end.
Nevertheless, one thing needs to be made very clear: both legislative bodies must meet in public; we owe that to Europe's citizens in the name of transparency. And it also has to be accepted that budgetary rights are the key rights of any parliament, and war will undoubtedly be declared if changes are made to those budgetary rights that are unacceptable to Parliament. I am sure that will also be borne in mind.
Then there are the so-called questions of power: voting rights in the Council, the composition of, and voting rights in, the Commission, and associated issues around the composition of the European Parliament. I am very conscious that this is probably something that the Heads of State and Government will be unable to sort out until the last night. However, there are a few issues we need to keep in mind, such as whether the threshold should be raised from 60 to 66, and other issues relating to the Commission. When it comes to overall willingness to compromise, there is one thing that should not be overlooked, and that is efficiency. It must be evident that the Council's ability to reach decisions in an enlarged Union must be guaranteed, and that is why the Convention proposed what it did, a fact that we must not lose sight of. We criticised the Treaty of Nice because we considered that the voting procedure in the Council was not adequate for an enlarged Union, and that must have been clear to our Polish friends from the outset, Mr Verheugen. People in the accession countries cannot now say that the details and mechanisms of the Treaty of Nice were presented in their referenda, and cite those as a source of legitimacy in the context of the discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference. If this is to succeed, efficiency must always be a priority, combined, of course, at all times with the required degree of democratic legitimacy. I sometimes worry deeply that many governments do not think, "How can the European Union achieve a majority for a required decision?" but rather "How easily can I block a decision?" That kind of thinking is a cause for concern, and we should try to resolve this.
With regard to the office of Foreign Minister, which was mentioned at our last sitting, I would like to point out that we are talking about a triple role, and not just a double one. The Foreign Minister would wear three hats: Member of the Commission, High Representative of the Council and President of the Council. All three need to be combined if this is to work. This House would not be happy about an arrangement whereby he was not a full Member of the Commission. It is extraordinarily important for him to be a full Member of the Commission, because only in that way is it possible to achieve true democratic control and a democratic appointment procedure, and the legitimacy which this House confers. Nor do we wish to see the Commission losing any of its foreign policy influence, if full responsibility is not given here for the area for which it is currently responsible, which would also mean Parliament indirectly losing responsibility in this area. For that reason we shall be lobbying hard for these three aspects to be interlinked. The Foreign Minister must also preside over the Council of Foreign Ministers, because only in that way can we simultaneously achieve coherence and continuity, and because only then will it really make sense to create this position in this way.
Lastly, I would like to make a comment about the review clause. I would like to remind you that the proposal put forward in the letter from Mr Amato, Mr Duff and myself should in fact be addressed again. There should be an opening, with the exception of the "Changes in Competence" and "Charter of Fundamental Rights" areas, which must, of course, continue to be covered by the existing procedure. However, we should remember something that was considered in the Convention: a review clause with opening and at the same time a secession clause. The only thing now outstanding is the secession clause, and I think that something is amiss here, and that we still need to consider that."@en1
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