Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-10-22-Speech-3-127"

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". Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I am quite happy to clearly explain the Presidency’s position on relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation, especially as, in a few days, on 28 October, I shall, in fact, be in Moscow, together with the European troika, to examine with Mr Ivanov the prospects for the European Union-Russian Federation Summit planned for Rome on 6 November. In the meantime, we hope to be able to report some progress even, as one might say, ‘under current regulations’, without changing the rules. Some Member States, including Italy, have already established bilateral agreements, and others have stated their intention to do so. The Presidency intends, of course, to work towards a common position that can so far as possible absorb the bilateral agreements. Lastly, the common space of culture and education: here we have to work much harder, because very little has been achieved so far. Among the positive points I can, however, mention the fact that the Russian Federation has recently joined the so-called ‘Bologna process’, a collaboration mechanism that promotes agreement on academic titles and the harmonisation of university curricula. It is an important development. I must also mention the possibility of renewing the cooperation agreement in the field of science and technology, and also the prospect of including the Russian Federation in certain Community programmes in the culture and education sector, something that the Italian Presidency is encouraging. With regard to the St Petersburg conclusions, there is one aspect on which there is still a difference of opinion: the way the Permanent Partnership Council operates. On the Russian side, they continue to interpret the St Petersburg Declaration as meaning that the council should meet not only in different guises depending on the various subjects dealt with, but also in the 25 + 1 format. On the European side, the belief is instead that the council should operate mainly according to the troika formula, even if the troika is opened up to other members who may be interested. I hope to deal with this matter in greater depth during my visit to Moscow on 28 October. In our talks with Moscow, we shall continue to stand by our positions of principle and our concerns regarding the protraction of the Chechnya crisis and respect for human rights. The match that is being played out in Chechnya has a significance that extends well beyond that territory: its outcome, whether positive or negative, will be felt throughout the Caucasus and will thus affect the overall security of the continent. We have shown the European Union’s support for the broad constitutional reform initiative that President Putin has launched through the adoption of a new Constitution, approved by a vast majority in a popular referendum. We have also supported the passing of an amnesty law, which will be important in furthering the reconciliation process. In the presidential consultations of 5 October 2003, we saw yet another step in the gradual resumption of normal political and administrative life in Chechnya. Today, we reiterate our support for President Putin’s institutional approach and for a political solution that involves those increasingly broad sections of the Chechen population that have no links with terrorism and are therefore entitled to take part in the process of democratic reconstruction. In parallel with constitutional reform, in fact, we believe that there is room to improve the current standards of human rights in the region and the relations between the Chechen population and their administrators. We shall also reiterate our interest and encouragement for the Russian authorities to achieve the swift and safe release of the representative, Arjan Erkel, who was kidnapped in the Caucasus in August 2002. Finally, during the Summit, we intend to underline the urgency for everyone involved, including the European Union and Russia, to redouble their efforts to achieve a solution to the current conflicts in the ex-Soviet sphere: I refer to Transdniestria and the southern Caucasus, in particular Nagorno Karabakh and South Ossetia. With the enlargement of the Union and the increasing proximity of our borders, the Union has become rather more sensitive to this than previously, as it directly affects the security of the continent. At the same time, we recognise the great responsibility that Moscow has to face and the great contribution it can make in seeking solutions that are satisfactory to all the parties concerned. We shall spare no effort or encouragement in this direction. I should first like to say that the Presidency believes that EU-Russian relations should have strategic importance and that it is therefore in the European Union’s interest to develop these relations into a close partnership: there is now a basis for it in the partnership and cooperation agreement, which was the subject of one of the first joint strategies drawn up by the European Union, and was brought up to date with the St Petersburg Declaration. We believe it is in our interest to encourage the reform process begun by the Russian Federation and its move towards closer relations with the European Union. This process seems contradictory at times. There are probably forces still operating within the Russian Federation which, perhaps furtively – so to speak – oppose this progressive integration of the Federation into European structures; but on the other hand such integration is an objective that President Putin strongly shares. This is why we must encourage those who wish to support and promote a closer and more positive relationship with the European Union. The St Petersburg Declaration was an important turning-point in our relations with Moscow and marked out a path that the Presidency, with the agreement of the Commission and the support of the Member States, intends to follow: we must give substance to this privileged strategic partner relationship that we intend to have with the Russian Federation. The St Petersburg Declaration marked out the path to create four common spaces. This approach, which we support, forms a basis for the work to be done at the forthcoming summit on 6 November. As regards the common economic space, first and foremost, we are waiting for the high-level working group to conclude its work. Commissioner Verheugen will be having a final meeting with his Russian counterpart, the deputy Prime Minister Mr Khristenko, on 28 October. We should then reach a final agreement on the actual concept of a common economic space and on operational matters arising from it. We hope – and we are working towards this – that we can agree on a common commitment to pursue an even higher level of integration of our economies, through greater liberalisation of trade and greater convergence in terms of regulations. In parallel, the European Union is involved in the negotiations for Russia to join the World Trade Organization. Talks are at a very advanced stage, although there are still a few problems to resolve: I refer, in particular, to energy prices and access to the services market. Commissioner Lamy recently spoke to the Council on this matter and was given strong encouragement to continue with the negotiations. We are aware that Russia’s membership of the World Trade Organization is an important, essential condition for a genuine common economic space. With regard to the common external security space, we are preparing a draft joint statement setting the criteria, principles and objectives of collaboration in the field of crisis management, which should cover the use of both military resources and civilian resources. We hope that through this joint declaration we can spotlight our cooperation in this area of special importance for the Union’s external actions. On the common internal security space front, we can report good collaboration, in particular in the fight against organised crime. We are on the finishing straight as regards signing the agreement between Europol and the Russian Interior Minister, and we hope to be able to report the event during the 6 November summit. Still on the subject of internal security, Russia had asked us to examine a new visa waiver scheme for short visits. We are aware that this is a request that can be set in the medium to long term, but a number of preconditions will need to be met first on the Russian side. Talks with the Russian authorities on this subject have already started and this is encouraging in any case; a working group has already met, on 13 October, to deal with this matter. We attach importance to concluding the negotiations on visas and also those on the readmission agreement: this is a particularly important area, I would say one of the conditions for examining, overall, the Russian request to abolish short-stay visas."@en1
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