Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-09-24-Speech-3-216"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20030924.6.3-216"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:translated text |
".
Mr President, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, honourable Members, ladies and gentlemen, Mr Lamy and I agree entirely in judging Cancún, to our regret, to have been a disappointment, a failure that leaves us all damaged and is of course also a setback for the whole Doha development agenda.
It would be wrong to take the view that this failure is ultimately attributable to the industrialised countries’ agricultural policies. The negotiating parties did not even get round to addressing that topic in a concluding round of negotiations. In the months leading up to it, the success of the negotiating round at Cancún was alleged to be largely the EU’s responsibility. At first we were told that we had to reform our common agricultural policy if the negotiations were to stand a chance of success. That is what we did, and the world even applauded us for doing so. We were then told that the conversations would collapse if we did not settle our differences with the Americans. In August, therefore, we drew up, with the USA, a compromise document giving the negotiations a solid structure that promised them success.
The bottom line is that the failure of the discussions makes losers of us all, and, in the final analysis, it is probably the developing countries that are the overall losers in the agricultural negotiations. This is particularly true of the G21 countries, which were most opposed to the approach proposed by Mr Pérez del Castillo.
The package on offer at Cancún would have enabled the developing countries to better integrate their economies into the world trading system, and, accordingly, to benefit from its advantages. Why do I say that? Because the package on offer at Cancún would have resulted in a rational reform of the system of agricultural trade; it would, in particular, have led to drastic cuts in the subsidies that distort competition, especially in the industrialised countries – which was one of the developing countries’ main objectives in the agricultural negotiations – and, among other things, the USA would have had to reform its agricultural policy. What, exactly, was on offer? In the area of domestic support the measures that most distort competition, the so-called ‘Amber Box’ and the ‘
’ payments, have been drastically cut back.
The Blue Box would have had a lid put on it, while there was, at the same time, provision for special preferential treatment for developing countries, to which input subsidies would have continued to be permitted. In the field of export competition, drastic cuts and disciplinary measures were proposed for export subsidies, state-funded export credits and the exploitation of surpluses disguised as food aid. There was, for the very first time, the prospect of the complete abolition of all forms of export promotion for a whole list of products of particular interest to the developing countries.
That is not all by a long way. Success in Cancún would have led to further substantial liberalisation of trade. Quite apart from its proposals on market access, which were in the interests of all concerned, the European Union, with the development aspects of the Doha agenda in mind, had made a number of far-reaching and specific proposals relating to these states. When the EU delegation arrived in Cancún, it demonstrated its support for the developing countries and its endorsement of the development agenda. I would sum this up by saying that our concessions to the developing countries played a part in making the European Union, today, far and away the most important importer of agricultural produce from developing countries.
Last year, we imported from developing countries agricultural produce to the value of EUR 35 billion, which amounts to more than the imports of the most important industrialised states taken together. We had adopted the ‘Everything but Arms’ agreement, which unilaterally opens the EU market to the forty-nine poorest countries in the world, without demanding political or economic concessions in return. We proposed that this concession should be extended to our partners among the industrialised countries and the more advanced countries in the developing world. We proposed that the industrialised countries should guarantee that at least 50% of the total agricultural imports from the developing countries should not be subject to import duties. Other things on offer included discussion of the escalation in customs duties, and the developing countries would have gained a special protection clause and separate arrangements for their specialised products.
Finally, the document drawn up by the facilitators left other issues, such as concerns not relating to trade, open to further negotiations, and proposed that the ‘peace clause’ be extended. As far as the future is concerned, I take the view that we have to continue on our ambitious path, but that we must also take great care in evaluating, analysing and planning every step that we take along it. Over the coming months, we must continue to put our weight behind constructive dialogue; whilst we must play a central role, success, at the end of the day, is dependent on all members of the WTO and also our willingness to move towards a position in the centre. This will, without doubt, demand from all of us – both the industrialised and the developing countries – not only political will but also the willingness to compromise."@en1
|
| lpv:unclassifiedMetadata |
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples