Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-09-23-Speech-2-006"
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"en.20030923.1.2-006"2
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".
Mr President, on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, I recommend that Parliament confirm the appointment of Mr Jean-Claude Trichet as the appropriate candidate for the office of President of the European Central Bank. The nominee has submitted a written statement and has given oral explanations to the committee in the course of a confirmation process. He has convinced the members of the committee not only of his personal integrity and professional competence, but also of his views on economic and monetary policy in the Eurozone. At the same time, he has shown that he is receptive to the demand for more transparency and democratic accountability for the European Central Bank.
Five years after its foundation, the European Central Bank has come of age. Its independence – in political, economic, financial, organisational and staffing terms – is guaranteed and is not challenged by the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Its high measure of independence, which exceeds that of America’s Federal Reserve, means that the ECB has a high measure of responsibility for macroeconomic and social development. This requires the greatest possible transparency in the interests of democracy and integration policy. For this reason, the transparency of decisions and the decision-making procedure is integral to the European Central Bank’s role. This effort to achieve transparency is reflected in the quarterly monetary dialogue with the European Parliament, in the regular publications and decisions, but also in reports, conferences and the inflation forecasts that are published every six months. A kind of cultural revolution has thus taken place in Europe. The culture of the national central banks in Europe did not have this kind of transparency. Incidentally, transparency is also in the ECB’s interests because it is still a new institution, and is thus especially reliant on establishing and consolidating its legitimacy, credibility and trustworthiness as a European authority.
Ultimately, a nation’s monetary system reflects all that the nation stands for and all that it aspires to and endures, to quote Europe’s leading economist Josef Schumpeter. I believe that at the current stage of the debate, incorporating the Maastricht Treaty in its entirety into the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was the right step. Over their centuries of existence, the role of the central banks has undergone radical change, starting with their private form of organisation in history to their changing status in the USA, the concept of combating inflation, and the role of an independent issuing bank. It may be too early to find answers to new challenges today. The task is to define the role of the Central Bank in a globalised world dominated by trade, commerce and international financial markets. That means not only dynamic markets, but also more and higher risks to international financial stability.
What role, then, can and should central banks play in order to contribute to financial stability, to avoid financial crises and to provide assistance? Is the ECB equipped for a role as a lender of last resort? Is this what we want? The euro has enhanced Europe’s international status as well. The ECB will have to play an ever greater role in defining and implementing appropriate policies for the global economy. We are concerned about the dramatic imbalance in the US economy and the risks that may arise for every other part of the world in the mid to long term as a result.
Many issues relating to the ECB’s future policy are tied in with the appointment of its new President. They include the definition of price stability as much as the issue of monetary policy instruments. Maintaining price stability as the primary goal must not result in the ECB removing support for growth and employment from its list of tasks. Monetary policy is not neutral, so the ECB must play a role, as a macroeconomic actor, in coordinating European policies. This is where willingness to engage in ex-post coordination is not enough. Decisions will have to be taken on this issue, and fresh impetus must come from the new President. The European Parliament expects other measures towards greater transparency as well, from the publication of summary reports of decisions, with arguments for and against the decisions adopted, to the (anonymous) results of voting in the ECB Governing Council. What is important is an open and transparent monetary policy in which access to the decision-making process is a given, because this is in all our interests and in the interest of the common good. The future President is able to build on the successful work undertaken by the first ECB President, Wim Duisenberg. The Members of the European Parliament are confident that he will face up to the new challenges and be able to find the right solutions."@en1
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