Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-09-02-Speech-2-210"
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".
I have been listening carefully to all these questions, Mr President. From what I have heard, I fear Members might be strengthening the position of those who maintain that agriculture is the only subject on the table at Cancún. This is not the case: there are in fact about nineteen others. As far as politics are concerned, I do not think it is really in the interests of the European Union to act as if agriculture were the only subject on the table at Cancún. We certainly do have a number of interests in agriculture. I referred earlier to the geographical factors for example. Nonetheless, our main interests lie elsewhere. I hope, therefore, that those of you who are concerned about the interests of the European Union in these negotiations will not contribute to this opinion that agriculture will be the only item on the agenda at Cancún.
I will, nevertheless, respond to the questions posed. Mr Cunha is right. Given that the situation of individual developing countries varies greatly, we must adopt a different approach for each of the countries we are concerned with. This process must operate within the multilateral system. It might not, however, always be easy to persuade Brazil to recognise that India’s position is different and vice versa. Even when Brazil maintains that it supports complete liberalisation, we know full well that this is not the Indian position. Arrangements of this sort will have to be established within the World Trade Organisation.
We must also ensure that there is a role for the rest of our commercial agriculture policy, if I may term it thus. As you know, this policy rests on asymmetrical bilateral accords: we open up our markets more than we require developing countries to do. I am thinking here of the system of generalised preferences and the ‘Everything but arms’ system. In a sense, in establishing these systems, we have taken unilateral action to support developing countries.
I have a clear response to the questions of Mr O'Neachtain, Mr Bernié and Mrs Maes on the relationships between the common agricultural policy, its development and the international World Trade Organisation negotiations. My position on this point is also the position of Commissioner Fischler, the position of the Commission and that of the European Union. It is a simple one. First, we agree on which reforms of the CAP we consider necessary. Once these decisions have been taken, and taking account of proposals by other parties, we agree to measures in line with those we agreed amongst ourselves being set in stone at the World Trade Organisation. In short, the chicken is the CAP and the egg is international trade negotiations.
Compared with the United States, we tend to adopt a bottom up approach, if I may put it like that. The United States negotiates at an international level, gives undertakings and then deals with the consequences for their own system of support for agriculture. By its very nature, our agriculture mandate is limited by the present state of CAP reforms. This has always been perfectly clear, everyone knows the situation. Take the example of sugar. The sugar market has yet to be reformed. The Commission is working on it and we are expecting a proposal in the coming weeks. The same goes for cotton, tobacco and olive oil. At this stage, however, the European Union cannot enter into any commitments in the negotiations, as this would entail a change in the common market organisation on which no decision has yet been taken. In short, on this point, the situation is perfectly clear. Experience bears out that, when necessary and generally for our own reasons, we know how to decide on reforms that give us a certain margin of manoeuvre in negotiations.
I would now like to turn to the agreement between the United States and the European Union, or, to be more precise, the interim framework agreement we negotiated this summer. I would respond to Mr De Clercq by saying that we have acted at the request of other members of the World Trade Organisation. The others urged us to reach an agreement. We are perceived as the two giants, spending around 1% of our national wealth on supporting the agricultural sector. They consider that it would be difficult to move forward with the negotiations as long as the United States and Europe hold different positions. We have responded to their request. It amounts to an interim position that would allow us to take the negotiations forward to the halfway stage. In that case, it would still need to complete the rest of the process. We are aware that certain countries, Japan on the one hand, and Brazil and Australia on the other, feel that the compromise reached is not exactly what they would like. There is nothing surprising in this.
Finally, I would like to respond to Mr van den Berg and Mrs Maes, who referred to the agreement providing access to generic medicines for the poorest countries. As to the agreement itself, it is the result of discussions and received the unanimous approval of the World Trade Organisation, including the two-thirds of its members who are developing countries. I am sufficiently familiar with how international negotiations are conducted to know that the countries sitting around the table of the World Trade Organisation do actually take the decisions. Decisions are not taken for them. At the WTO negotiation table, the interests of developing countries are expressed by government representatives from these countries. The procedure is the same at the WHO, the FAO and the ILO. As soon as these government representatives state that they are satisfied with a decision that they had been pressing for for years, I consider that the negotiations have been concluded. I can be fairly sure though that some NGO or other will then maintain that the developing countries should have negotiated more forcefully. It is equally likely, however, that some pharmaceutical company or other will consider that we are the ones who should have negotiated more forcefully. This is what compromise is all about. I cannot put myself in the place of developing countries and say what is, or is not, in their interests. A political decision has been taken, and, consequently, this compromise will underpin our action in the years to come.
This being that case, as I said a few moments ago, only part of the problem of access to generic medicines for the poorest countries has been resolved through this agreement. We have dealt with the problem of international patent law. This represents 10 % of the problem. We still need to deal with the difficulties that are not linked to the patent problem, namely the problems of finance, production and availability. To put it another way, 90% of the work remains to be done. We must work together, and join forces with other international organisations, especially those established to finance the work to combat some of the relevant diseases. This is about supporting development. It is about national governance. I do not overestimate the 10% of the work we have completed. It had to be done to show others the way forward. You must be aware of this, as we have been discussing matters with you on a very regular basis for three years. The way ahead is open. We can now dare to hope, something we have, unfortunately, not been in a position to do for far too long, as far as this issue is concerned."@en1
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