Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-09-01-Speech-1-083"
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"en.20030901.6.1-083"2
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"Mr President, I congratulate Mr Radwan on his report, which really does get to grips with all the issues raised since the first drafts from Basel, which demand that the special economic and social circumstances in the EU be taken into account. The international bank supervisors and issuing banks in Basel, and the Commission in Brussels, have already met many of the demands made by us in Parliament, but there are still a few major stumbling blocks to be dealt with. In particular, the Commission must take our concerns into account in its deliberations, even though, formally speaking, we are not involved in the process and it is only next year that we will be dealing with the directive to incorporate this agreement into the
as a whole.
The consequence of this is that we MEPs find the process of working through this rather complicated; of the Commission, it demands a willingness to cooperate, and that to the utmost. We MEPs take the view that there are two principles that must be adhered to. Firstly, we take the view that any banking supervision law must, in the final analysis, serve to protect creditors, by which is meant savers, and ensure the functioning of the financial market, and, secondly, as we in the EU are endeavouring to create an internal market for financial services, transposition should be by means of a directive that leaves room for special rules at the national level only when, in really objective terms, there are special circumstances.
The first principle demands that the risks entered into by the banks be defined and assessed in an objective way. Banks calculate equity capital on the basis of the risk of loans being defaulted on, and this, in its turn, of course, has an effect on the interest charged to the borrowers. The Basel II system – for that is what I am talking about – must maintain a balance. It must not lead to extra burdens that banks and borrowers will find unfair, disproportionate and uncontainable, nor must it hamper employment and innovation. I know that is a bit much to ask for, but that is the basic precondition for the whole thing being acceptable.
When the directive for a large and liquid internal market is prepared, account must be taken of the need for special rules at national level not to be allowed to increase unchecked. Consumer protection, too, needs to be harmonised across frontiers if competition is not to be bounded by national borders. One of the distinguishing characteristics of our social structure is the co-existence of enterprises run as private businesses alongside those that perform services of general interest. Private/public partnerships are a case in point, and it is only in such cases that it is appropriate to permit rules at national level on banking supervision law.
If the same yardsticks are applied to all these borrowers, the system of evaluation will become more expensive, or the banks will be hindered from giving credit. I would like to conclude by again pointing out that credit given in the future must not be allowed to restrict the labour market, and nor must Basel II be allowed to serve as a pretext for the cancelling or restricting credit. We already have uncertain growth, and we must not allow matters to be made even worse by banks passing on debts to Basel II. What business management requires, and what is economically desirable, is simply an objective approach when assessing the risks of individual borrowers, calculating the interest rate for the credit, and when agreeing to give it. It is this principle that reinforces my positive stance in relation to Basel II."@en1
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