Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-07-03-Speech-4-010"
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"en.20030703.1.4-010"2
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"Mr President, Commissioner, I too would like, if I may, to wish Mr Duisenberg success in the future that is on a par with all that he has managed to achieve in the European Central Bank. I will not wish you good luck in your fishing, Mr Duisenberg, because, as an Italian from the south of Italy, I am afraid that it might bring you bad luck.
I would also like to congratulate Mr Blokland, whose report focuses on the responsibilities of the European Central Bank in Europe and the responsibilities that it will have to take on with a view to the imminent entry of the ten new countries into the Union. According to the terms of the Treaties, the primary goal of the European Central Bank is to define monetary policy in Europe and to ensure price stability through monetary policy. Personally, I am convinced that, irrespective of this principal responsibility, the European Central Bank must play a more effective role in the economy, using moral suasion methods, not least, which have yielded surprisingly successful results in the field of bank supervision.
I tabled an amendment, which was not accepted in committee, which sought to provide a more detailed, comprehensive definition of the Pact. It would have read as follows: a uniform interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact must be achieved in order to avoid undermining the credibility of the euro area and thus the effectiveness of its monetary policy; considers that the European Central Bank must confirm to the Commission that the Pact is being implemented with sufficient flexibility as to promote growth. Indeed, the Pact was created not just with a view to achieving stability but also in order to boost growth to acceptable levels. Growth as a key objective of the Pact can also be achieved through investment in large-scale work and financial undertakings in the field of research, outside public spending. Of course, this option must not become an excuse for abandoning the rigour of public finances and must be supported by a totally sustainable fiscal policy, as implemented so successfully in the United Kingdom.
The recently approved draft Constitution includes provisions governing the European monetary institutions, or rather, the role of the ECB and the national central banks and their sensitive relationship. Over this period, some national central banks have feared radical resizing with subsequent centralisation of power in Frankfurt. They did not want the European Central Bank to become a fully-fledged institution on the grounds that this would jeopardise the independence of the monetary institution, but I am sure this was just an excuse. This deadlock between the European Central Bank and the national central banks has caused confusion, and it is only in Article 29(3) that we have a comprehensive definition: the European Central Bank shall have legal personality. Looking at the other decisions made in this field, it has to be said that, in Europe and Parliament, as elsewhere, the compromise approach has taken root which often, far from bringing about convergence of differing positions, generates, in many cases, uncertainty and confusion regarding the matter in question. As a result of these compromises, a complicated method of voting has been decided on for the members of the Bank’s Governing Council, the printing of banknotes has been split willy-nilly between the different monetary institutions, and, above all, a decentralised system has been preserved which will become overcomplicated and ineffective with eastward enlargement.
To sum up, over and above the Convention’s decisions, we need to ask ourselves whether, in order to take into due account the guiding role of the European Central Bank and the interests of the individual national central banks, we should not be taking the path of dividing up the responsibilities between centre and periphery, with consequent specialisation of the national central banks, which would have to supervise minor financial institutions too. I hope that many of these points will be clarified at the Intergovernmental Conference."@en1
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