Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-07-01-Speech-2-040"
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"en.20030701.1.2-040"2
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"Mr President, the President-in-Office of the Council has discussed various aspects of the process of the EU’s enlargement, and these were also addressed in Thessaloniki. From this, the impression is created that the process is currently going hand in hand with less stringent criteria. In the past, we most definitely did not want to set down any dates for the start of negotiations, the end of negotiations or for accession to the European Union. Nowadays, dates are being suggested quite spontaneously which, in themselves, are also being interpreted in all kinds of ways. With regard to Romania and Bulgaria, our resolution was reported to state initially that we appreciate it that those countries have set themselves a target date, namely 2004. We have not given an opinion either way, but we are increasingly hearing that we assume that the negotiations can be finalised by the end of 2004. One cannot help wondering whether conditions are also being prescribed for the implementation of what is being laid down in law.
Will, for example, Romania be a country that functions normally by 2007, or will it still be weighed down by corruption and political power-play that overlook the interests of the general public? We never imagined that what we used to call the two waves would follow each other in such quick succession. We are therefore surprised about those dates 2004-2007 for Romania and Bulgaria. The western Balkans and Kosovo are also being mentioned in the same breath. I should note in this connection, and it must be patently clear to the authorities in Kosovo, that nobody here wants an ethnically-based Member State. Could this be a case, perhaps, of misplaced guilt in respect of the candidates left behind? This feeling is not present among Union citizens. The people have become more critical; the importance of a well-functioning Europe has become greater. The economic political problems of the new accession states have also grown and meanwhile, it seems as if the Council and Commission have become more lenient.
Then, as the President-in-Office of the Council also mentioned there is the largest potential enlargement: the accession of Turkey. Unfortunately, a date has also been set for the start of negotiations while no conditions have been laid down for this. According to Turkey’s interpretation, this is an unconditional date.
It would be unfortunate if the Council and the Commission were susceptible to Turkey’s criticism that they are not reacting quickly enough and that surely, Turkey has now waited long enough, while it is we who have waited for the changes in Turkey to take place. Luckily, the President-in-Office of the Council mentioned the minorities, religious freedom and the position of the army. The Commission on its part has promised an inquiry into the role of the army. This strikes me as extremely important, provided this does not simply look into the extent to which the current situation at the start of the negotiations about other chapters can be maintained as much as possible. It appears to me that a priority has been set here which we must handle with the greatest of care. We must also deal with the changes in Turkey required by us with due care. These cannot simply be made in the course of a few years without causing major damage. We should not be guided by a fear of driving Turkey away in this. After all, the introduction of quasi-Iranian conditions is probably the last thing the army will allow. This calls for staying power and caution. The solution to the Cyprus problem, in particular, will be one of the benchmarks for Turkey’s accession, because that is where the army’s role is felt most acutely. The Balladur initiative on borders and good neighbourliness are, in fact, the basis for Copenhagen’s political conditions. It would be naive to think that no country would use its veto if Cyprus were not re-united."@en1
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