Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-06-18-Speech-3-077"
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"en.20030618.7.3-077"2
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".
Mr President, I wish to inform you all, as succinctly and briefly as I can, about the work that is being undertaken on what could be called ‘European security’.
What I would like to say, however, and we have attempted to make the document reflect this deeply-considered idea, is that in order to ensure an effective multilateral system and more specifically the credibility of the United Nations system, we must in theory be prepared to ensure that all the principles on which the United Nations is founded are observed and that this organisation has the credibility that it deserves.
When some of the principles underpinning the Charter and some Security Council resolutions are not observed, the European Union cannot remain passive and must act; and it must act with all the considerable means available to it. Fortunately, the European Union has a whole panoply of means for acting that range from diplomatic activity to armed peacekeeping action.
Mr Hughes, who is not present at the moment, made a useful incidental observation on how the European Union can also play a major role in effective dialogue in the event of conflict. We must have the courage, however, to say to ourselves that when rules, the principles that we have all decided to defend in the context of this effective multilateralism are flouted, the European Union must also be willing to face up to this breach of international agreements or contracts, be they political or of any other type.
Lastly, the third point that must be made is how to deal with the new threats, which are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons and failed states ... On these issues which are new or which involve new aspects, although some of them have been around for many years, we have to say that they are risks and threats of a different kind to those that we have experienced before. The first difference is that they can be perpetrated from a distance. Throughout the cold-war era, we were used to having threats at our borders. Today we are facing perhaps the first threat situated far from our border and we consequently need to deploy our capacities beyond our borders. I therefore believe that when we were given the mandate in Helsinki, at the end of 1999, to start considering how the European Union could undertake civilian and military action, this possibility was also being considered.
These new threats are also dynamic, and we must therefore prevent them and try, as soon as possible, to ensure that they are not allowed to become a reality, whether they are caused by hunger, climate change or other types of conflict, such as ethnic or religious struggles. I believe that swift prevention is an obligation incumbent upon us and must form one strand of the philosophy underlying the European Union’s action.
These new threats are more complex, more complicated than anything we have experienced before and consequently our response to them cannot be a simple one. We cannot respond to something that is complex with simplicity; our response must also be complex and it would, in my opinion, be a mistake to think that there can be a military solution to these problems. I do not believe that there can be and what we therefore have to do is make use of all the means, the entire panoply of means available to the European Union as a whole. These range, as I have said, from diplomacy, humanitarian aid, crisis management, trade, sanctions etc. to managing crises with military means. I believe, however, that it would be an extremely serious mistake to think that the only solution to this type is a military one. I also believe it would be wrong to think that the focus of the war against these new threats should be strictly military.
To conclude, I should like the document to end with a call for a Europe with clearly-defined characteristics, a Europe that must be more active on the world stage and which must therefore have the political will to act.
I hope that the debate that has taken place in recent months in the Convention leads to the conclusion, not only by Parliament but also by the citizens of our continent, that if we genuinely want to assume our rightful position in the world, with the wealth and the well-being that we enjoy, we also have obligations associated with these benefits and these obligations must be met. There must, therefore, be greater activity, a greater political will to act and this, I believe, is crucial.
If we wish to act, therefore, we must have the capacity to act; and hence we must also make the necessary effort, which involves developing military and civilian capacities; and I cannot conceal the fact that having greater capacities to act and to exert influence in the world also requires more resources.
This Parliament and national parliaments, national governments, will have to face up to this reality; otherwise our words will be somewhat hypocritical. We cannot cry when we see the suffering of others on television and yet not be willing to do what needs to be done. In order to do what needs to be done, we must have the resources and these resources are going to have to come from the citizens of our continent, of our own European Union, who will also have to be generous enough to pay for the resources necessary to undertake the action that we are being asked every day to carry out.
As you will recall, ladies and gentlemen, at the Rhodes meeting I was given the mandate to try to present, in time for the Thessaloniki European Council, a document on issues related to European security, although this will probably not be the last document on the matter.
In my first speech, I spoke about the operation in the Congo. This is an example of what we might have to do in future and it will surely be on a larger scale. We are able to undertake such action at the moment because of the means we can pool together, but also because of the means available to some nations in particular that can take on this role; others cannot. We must all, therefore, make an effort to maintain a level of capacities that will enable us to play the role we say we want to play.
I repeat, the Europe we want is a Europe that has greater visibility, a will to act, and the means with which to put this will into practice; it is a Europe that also has the necessary coherence to act, and by this I mean that there must be coherence, within the European Union and in all of its institutions and between the European Union and its Member States so that the entire effort, for example the diplomatic effort, can bear fruit. Consider for a moment that the European Union’s diplomatic network, with all of its Member States, would be considerably greater than that of the country with the largest diplomatic network. If we put it to the service of a cause, we would probably be a thousand times more effective than we are at the moment.
I believe that the document that we shall be presenting to the Heads of State and Government on Thursday and Friday in Thessaloniki follows this approach, which I believe is in line with the ideas of most Members of this Parliament.
I must emphasise that what is significant is that for the first time the European Union wishes to have a document of this type; there is a desire not only for Member States to have their own documents, but also for the European Union, collectively, to have a document on its security strategy. I believe that this is a first, and I want to underline that this is a major step forwards in building a Europe which moves ahead by political means.
First of all, I base my approach on a fundamental principle, which underpins the entire content of the document. A Europe of these dimensions, with 25 democratic countries, which will soon have a population twice as large as that of the United States of America and four times that of Japan (and I take as examples the large countries that, like ours, have a strong currency), a Europe which accounts for approximately one quarter of gross world product must not fail, I repeat, to be an international player. Whether we want to or not, we will have to be an international player. This principle, in which I firmly believe – and in which I hope you also believe, ladies and gentlemen – must underpin our entire approach to managing the process of achieving security in Europe.
The document is about to be completed and will be presented to the Heads of Government next Thursday and Friday in Thessaloniki. I now wish to summarise its structure for you.
It opens with an analysis of the security environment in which we live, which obviously includes regional conflicts and the causes of these conflicts that affect us: poverty, exclusion, or a lack of natural resources. The report then goes on to look at more recent threats such as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states.
On the basis of this analysis, it moves on to a second chapter which addresses what must, in our opinion, be the main strategic objectives for Europe’s security. Logically, the first strategic objective must be to extend and stabilise the security zone around the European Union, in other words, around our continent, specifically to the east and the south.
I believe that the document that the Commission presented recently on the new Europe and Europe’s borders is largely concerned with where and how the European Union should start developing its security environment.
The second important point about strategic security objectives must, in our opinion, be to strengthen the international order. We could probably describe Europe’s place in the international order in this way: we are effective multilateralists and it is on effective multilateralism that we must base our theory of the world order. For this reason, we are working and wish to continue working to protect Europe’s security through all organisations and specifically through the United Nations. Of course, there are players that have more individual roles to play, such as the United States, the Russian Federation and other large countries or major international players."@en1
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