Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-05-14-Speech-3-151"
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"en.20030514.8.3-151"2
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"Mr President, Mr President-in-Office, ladies and gentlemen, the forthcoming EU-Russia Summit in St Petersburg provides a welcome opportunity to briefly take stock of our relations and to analyse the problems that we have to solve together.
Lastly, we would like to emphasise that we may have different views about the process of adapting to EU enlargement. Russia is currently working on the assumption that extending the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to the new EU Member States provides an opportunity to renegotiate trade policy and other issues. We do not see it that way. In contrast, we hope that the basically positive view of EU enlargement in Russia will help to maintain the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement as the basis of our relations, including the new Member States. The Commission will not enter into any negotiations about the consequences of enlargement.
This wide range of subjects and the need to give all the Heads of State present in St Petersburg an opportunity to put forward their viewpoints makes thorough preparation of the St Petersburg Summit all the more necessary. The EU is being represented here, in the time-honoured fashion, by the Presidency, the Commission and the Council Secretariat, and Mr Yiannitsis has already reported in detail on the objectives the Council is pursuing in this context, and there is total agreement on all this.
Both sides are in full agreement that we have wide-ranging relations on a long-term basis, and that these relations need to be based on common values and should be further developed in the direction of a strategic partnership. For our part, we attach particular importance to cooperation in what we regard as areas of risk that we can only overcome together, such as environmental protection, nuclear safety and justice and home affairs issues. Our relations with Russia will also, but not to the exclusion of all else, be shaped by the enlargement of the European Union, as the debate that we have just had shows. The neighbourhood policy that we discussed here this afternoon plays an important role in our relations with Russia, but there are also other significant factors, such as the security of the European Union's energy supply, the joint war on terror, and the need for cooperation to solve major regional and global problems.
On Russia's side, there is particular interest in cooperation on security policy, as evidenced by Russian participation in the police mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina or the proposal for a joint European centre for crisis management.
We have recently made very good progress in some areas, particularly on Kaliningrad. I am pleased to say that the transit issues that the European Parliament dealt with in considerable detail have now been resolved. The instruments that we proposed in conjunction with Russia at the time have now been introduced and can be implemented as from July. A special Tacis programme for Kaliningrad has also been agreed so as to help ensure that instead of the socio-economic gap between Kaliningrad and neighbouring countries widening – which has already been mentioned this afternoon – it will be narrowed.
As the President-in-Office of the Council has already said, good progress has been made in negotiations on a readmission agreement. I would also like to mention that the energy dialogue with Russia has led to concrete results. Examples of this are agreement on projects of common interest and the energy technology centre in Moscow. We hope that we will be able to present a joint plan for the common economic area by the end of this year. Good progress is being made in the negotiations on Russia's membership of the WTO.
Next week we will be signing the multilateral nuclear environmental programme with Russia and other donor countries in Stockholm. This certainly represents a breakthrough in dealing with contaminated nuclear sites in north-west Russia. We are hoping for a ban on single-hull vessels transporting heavy fuel oils in the Baltic Sea. Unfortunately, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has not yet been achieved in Russia. This subject will therefore have to be given high priority in the forthcoming talks at political level.
We should not ignore the fact that there are many areas where, although we agree on the fundamental objectives, we nevertheless have different ideas about how to achieve those objectives. Neither side wants to see new ‘moats’ or ‘curtains’ in Europe. In particular, the Commission hopes that the neighbourhood policy proposals it brought forward in March will prevent new ‘moats’ developing on the European Union's eastern borders, which could lead to a two-class Europe.
The enlarged Union will have to further intensify and deepen cooperation with its neighbours, but our security needs dictate that the new Member States should also fully and effectively implement the Schengen rules when they join Schengen. There are considerable reservations within the European Union about the Russians' desire for a detailed timetable for complete visa freedom. It is of course conceivable as a long-term objective, and it is something the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement committees could deal with. Nevertheless, we should as of now be taking advantage of the full scope of the Schengen framework to make minor border traffic as simple as possible and to promote cross-border economic development. This will of course also require the refinement of technical assistance instruments.
I am grateful that the President-in-Office commented on Chechnya. I simply wish to confirm that on behalf of the Commission. Chechnya is also still very much on our agenda and our list of priorities remains the same: a peaceful political solution, respect for human rights and humanitarian aid. We concur with the Russians that our cooperation structures should be shaped more efficiently. Nevertheless, we cannot agree to their wish for extensive use of the 15+1 formula, or in future a 25+1 formula. This brings us very close indeed to the central issue of the EU's identity. We do, however, believe that there is considerable scope for improving the way the institutions work under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, especially as regards the Cooperation Council."@en1
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