Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-05-13-Speech-2-062"
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"en.20030513.4.2-062"2
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".
Mr President, I very much welcome the Commission proposal which, if adopted and adjusted slightly, would bring forward a substantial improvement to the current system and indeed could form the basis of solving once and for all this problem of the so-called comitology system that has been a difficulty for years.
Finally, we propose to keep the special procedures that were agreed under the so-called Lamfalussy procedures. I gather that is not a matter of controversy.
I am pleased to say that other committees, such as the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy, which has a lot of experience with comitology, and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, which has begun to deal with the Lamfalussy procedures, fully support the approach that the Committee on Constitutional Affairs has taken on this. If we manage to find a solution to this issue now we will have eliminated a problem that has messed up and held up numerous legislative procedures, and we will have removed one of the obstacles to Parliament being willing to delegate far more implementing powers to the Commission than is the case under these procedures. If we have the right to call back in the way that is envisaged we will be able to delegate much more than we can now, knowing that we have the safety of being able to scrutinise and call back if necessary. That is something that all should welcome.
All systems, be they national parliamentary or European Parliamentary systems, have methods of delegating powers to the executive: implementing powers, secondary legislation – call them what you like. I will not get into a theological argument about the definition of such powers. But it is normal practice. What is not normal is the way we do it in the European Union where we set up, alongside the Commission, committees of national civil servants which, in some cases, have the powers to block the Commission. Indeed so many committees have been set up that the name comitology was invented to describe a system that was so difficult to fathom and so difficult to get to grips with.
The system was greatly improved in 1999 when the revised system was adopted by the Council: greater transparency, a greater guarantee that Parliament has access to all the proposals and all the documents. That is very good, but it has left two fundamental problems. Firstly, the Commission's powers are scrutinised only by committees of national civil servants, which alone have the power to block the Commission and call back the decision to the legislative authority. Secondly, if a decision is called back, it only goes to one branch of the legislative authority, namely the Council, even when it is codecision legislation adopted in the first place by Parliament and the Council jointly. That is something we find unacceptable.
We want equal rights of call back for Parliament and the Council – Parliament by an absolute majority, the Council by a qualified majority, as is the bottom line now when a matter goes back to the Council. We should have the right to call back an implementing measure. If it is called back there should be equal rights of scrutiny for both Parliament and the Council.
The Commission proposal almost achieves that. It comes very close to doing that. The fly in the ointment is the word 'possibly', which is in the Commission's draft. In other words the Commission, if we object to a draft, will possibly amend it to take account of our objections or refer it to the legislative procedure. In my view and that of the committee, the word 'possibly' should go because only then will we really have a basis for a definitive solution to this issue.
Why does the Commission insist on the word 'possibly'? It says that the current legal basis of the Treaties does not allow it to go any further. I beg to disagree. If you look at the fact that the legislation is adopted anyway, in the first place, under codecision by Parliament and the Council, it is up to Parliament and the Council to put in place any system, and any checks and balances that they want. If one argues that such checks and balances must conform to Article 202, then let us look at that article. It says: 'The Council may impose certain requirements in respect of the exercise of implementing powers.' 'Certain requirements' is the wording on which the whole comitology system is based. If such a complex system can be set up on the basis of that clause in the Treaty, there is absolutely nothing to prevent the Council from setting up a different system – the one which we are advocating – that gives the Council and Parliament equal rights to call back and equal rights to scrutinise. Article 202, in other words, is much more flexible than the Commission's legal service seems to believe.
I would therefore urge the Commission to accept our amendment concerning the word 'possibly'. I give notice now that if the Commission does not accept that amendment then, before the final vote, I as rapporteur will move that the issue be referred back to committee, where we will pursue further negotiations with the Commission on this issue.
We have also sought to amend the Commission proposal to make it slightly more flexible. This is something I hope the Commission will welcome. We propose to give the Commission the right simply to withdraw an implementing measure if Parliament objects to it or indeed if the Council objects to it. This is common sense. Some implementing measures are discretionary, not obligatory. If we think that the Commission does not need to adopt an implementing measure at the time or of the style that the Commission envisages, and we object to it, the Commission should be able to withdraw it. That is already provided for in our Rules of Procedure.
I understand that the PPE-DE is opposed to that amendment. I look forward to hearing their arguments on this, but it is in conformity with what Parliament adopted in the Bourlanges report only a few months ago. We similarly propose to give the Commission the right to maintain an implementing measure, provisionally, when Parliament has objected to it, pending a full legislative procedure to review, amend or repeal the implementing measure – again an element of flexibility that I expect the Commission to welcome."@en1
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