Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-04-09-Speech-3-238"
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"en.20030409.5.3-238"2
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"Mr President, Commissioner, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, it has always been a dream of mine to speak following a de Gaulle, but not one who makes speeches like that one.
Today, as we debate the future of European security and defence policy, we watch as war rages in Iraq, a war that we had believed we could avert by diplomatic means. We failed, though, in our attempt to do so, being politically disunited and lacking any military presence. At a time when war and peace were at stake, we were – and not for the first time – not even prepared. We got there too late, just as we had in Bosnia, in Kosovo and in Afghanistan.
In none of these armed conflicts did the European Union, as an international actor, play a part in deciding the course of events. It is for that reason that the Morillon Report is summed up in the statement that the Union will count only if it has clearly-defined foreign policy objectives and interests and possesses effective military capacity. Only a Union like that can become an independent actor in global politics and have confidence in itself as a partner in transatlantic relations.
Not a few heads of government, knowing how powerless they are in the face of the war in Iraq, now think that they must now publicise the objective of a European Defence Union. I wonder: did these heads of government not play a part in the resolutions passed since Helsinki in 1999? Why did they not do more to make the EU's Rapid Reaction Force operational, making it what it was planned to be by 2003 – combat-effective, equipped with state-of-the-art technology and with command structures and logistical capacities to match? Why did the adaptation and reform of their national armed forces not keep pace with the new challenges to security? Why were military budgets cut back in this way? Why, when transporting our own troops in our own country, did we have to hire aircraft from the Ukraine?
Ever since 1999, Parliament has continuously argued in favour of the Union's foreign policy instruments being supplemented by military capabilities. This is currently being debated in the Convention too. This report is also intended to be Parliament's contribution to answering the question – one of key importance in terms of the future – of how the European Union can keep its citizens safe from new terrorist threats, and how it can contribute to the peace and stability of the world. Pre-emptive wars lacking any legitimacy must become a thing of the past!
That is why this report expresses our support for all those in the Convention who favour updating the Petersberg tasks, who are in favour of a vanguard of Member States being able to undertake military crisis missions, who support a European armaments agency in some form, who advocate a European support and solidarity clause and who, in particular, seek the introduction of majority decisions in foreign policy and enhanced cooperation in defence policy – both of which are of crucial importance.
We do believe, however, that governments must be clear in their own minds about the fact that millions of people, in the run-up to the war in Iraq, took to the streets of European cities to demonstrate their conviction that decisions on war and peace should be for parliaments rather than for cabinets. Those whose decision it is to deploy a European rapid reaction force in crisis situations need a high degree of democratic legitimacy.
Let me put forward my final contention, which is that all rapid intervention operations to be contemplated within the framework of the ESDP will possess both a civil and a military element. It is precisely in that respect that we differ from NATO. In Bosnia, we are now represented by a police mission. Next year, we may well be taking over the SFOR mission from NATO. We can best guarantee cohesion between civil and military operations if the same rules apply to both, and if the shared costs of each are borne by the European Union Budget. Although this has to do with parliamentary control, another result is democratic support and endorsement for actions by governments.
In any case, the citizens of the European Union are already saying ‘yes’ to the concept of a European defence policy as outlined in the Morillon Report. It is supported by 71% of them. It is only the cabinets on whom the truth has not yet dawned."@en1
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