Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-04-08-Speech-2-277"
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"en.20030408.8.2-277"2
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".
Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to follow on directly from Mr Turco's speech and respond to it with my own thanks.
In this instance, we agreed on a common approach, one that would involve rejecting the Danish and Greek initiatives and adopting our own recommendation on Europol's future development, but, despite the common draft, our arguments do of course differ to some extent. It is the case that, in the past, we in the European Parliament made matters easy for ourselves by rejecting every proposal for amending the Europol Convention. Our justification for doing so was the lack of democratic and judicial control over Europol, for, belonging as it does to the third pillar, Europol has hitherto not been subject either to parliamentary control by the European Parliament or to judicial control by the European Court of Justice, whilst the national parliaments mainly had no interest in controlling it either.
There were a number of extensions of Europol's competences that we in the European Parliament were unwilling to agree to without increased powers of control. The Danish proposal, though, on which I am reporting, contains precisely this increase in Parliament's opportunities for control, in that, according to it, Parliament is to be consulted on numerous issues, including the collection, processing and utilisation of personal data, the transmission of data to third states, the establishment of rules on secrecy and the protection of confidentiality in relation to personal status and, finally, any amendment of the Europol Convention as well.
Even the proposed facility whereby national authorities should in future be able to communicate directly with Europol would be a real step forward. It strikes me, for a start, that it would not make sense to reject all this, and, even though this has been the line we have taken in the past as a matter of principle, I considered welcoming the proposal, on the grounds that it should be seen in the context of the debate in the Convention, where, at this time, Working Group X had proposed the dissolution of the European Union's third pillar – Justice and Internal Affairs – and the transfer of Europol to the first pillar. This would entail both judicial control by the European Court of Justice and parliamentary control by way of the European Parliament's budgetary rights. Seen in this light, then, it initially made sense to anchor a consultation procedure in the Europol Convention. Now, though, the proposals put forward by the Convention presidium have caught up with the Danish initiative, something for which thanks are especially owed to Commissioner Vitorino.
I will be honest, Commissioner, and concede that I did not at first think it possible that the Convention would indeed bring itself to make Europol subject to a codecision procedure, to be termed in future a legislative procedure, with equal rights for Parliament and for the Council, but what I asked for at the end of each of my previous speeches has now been granted. In this area, the Convention has indeed demonstrated courage. Whilst, when I consider the amendments tabled by members of the Convention, I do find a few asking for the Council to reach unanimous decisions in this area, I can find not one single amendment intended to curtail the role envisaged for the European Parliament. That being so, we can assume a broad consensus, and so the Danish initiative, with the consultation procedure it contains, can be shelved.
It is, nonetheless, possible to make improvements to the presidium's proposals. For a start, the Council's authority to draw up guidelines should be done away with, as, secondly, should Article 9's restriction on control by the Court of Justice. Thirdly, in general terms, unanimity in the Council in matters concerning Europol, as requested by a number of members of the Convention, is something to be rejected. Fourthly, the legislative procedure must make it possible for Europol to conduct its own investigations, in collaboration with the appropriate officials in the Member States. Such a transfer of competences could, in the first instance, also be subject to unanimity, although Parliament's rights must under no circumstances be curtailed. Fifthly, Europol must also be able to act in defence of the EU's financial interests when asked to do so by Eurojust or of the Public Prosecutor yet to be appointed as part of it. This is where cooperation with this institution must be regulated in even more precise terms; it must not be left to internal agreements, as was the case before. Sixthly, control by Eurojust will be meaningful only when Europol has had real executive powers handed over to it, for, until they have been, the fact that Europol remains subject to the control of national public prosecutors will result in structures being duplicated. The seventh point is that Europol must be given access to the various computer systems – among which I will mention only the Schengen Information System, the Customs Information System, and Eurodac – which are to be united in one single uniform computer system with different entitlements to access it.
My eighth point follows on from this. Europol has to have standardised data protection along the lines of Directive 46/95, and it needs simple language rules. Last but not least, the requirement that the Member States cooperate with Europol needs to be enforced more strictly. Many Member States are still sending Europol too few data or none at all.
We now urge the Council not to go on blocking the use of EU Budget resources to fund Europol in its counter-terrorist activities until such time as the Intergovernmental Conference has adopted such a constitutional treaty. The public cannot be persuaded that their security suffers when the Interior Ministers feel that their competences have been trespassed upon. In any case, the Convention leaves room for a generous interpretation.
At the same time, the Council must make preparations for the Europol Convention to be carried over into legislation. It is now for all of us to ensure that the Convention is a success. I believe, indeed, that our success is predestined, for without these advances we will, in the long term, fail in our attempts to combat crime in Europe. So, today too, I will end with words that even Mr Coelho will endorse: by the way, it is my opinion that the Convention must be even more courageous."@en1
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