Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-03-11-Speech-2-158"
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"en.20030311.7.2-158"2
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".
Mr President, I shall be brief. Two different issues have emerged during this debate. The first concerns the system proposed by the Central Bank, based on the implementation of the enabling clause. The question arises as to whether it is logical or not and whether a better system could be devised. The second issue concerns what a better system might involve. It might be the system detailed in Mr Friedrich’s report or it might be different again.
What we are concerned with at present, however, is the enabling clause established at Nice. The governments are referring to it authorising the Central Bank to present a proposal which must be unanimously approved. They are also referring to it in connection with a Commission proposal, which must also be unanimously approved.
The enabling clause only provides either for all the members of the central banks to be present and for all of them to vote, or, alternatively, for a system of restricted voting. Such a system would have to involve rotation. Clearly, a system of rotation means that not everyone would be involved in everything. The issue of the nature of the system of rotation then arises.
There is no doubt that the model presented by the Central Bank does provide for a weighting of the countries based on their respective financial and economic significance. As a result, the smaller countries are given a significant role.
The Commission is of the opinion, however, that there is not sufficient justification for the proposed system of rotation. The Commission therefore proposes adjusting the system of rotation only. All the Commission has done is to propose using the current Central Bank criteria to define its voting system. As I said, all this means is using the system the Bank has in place at present.
This system will of course involve a change. Not everyone will be present. The enabling clause does however provide for this. It would not make sense to table a further proposal for a different system of rotation, instead of suggesting an amendment to the Central Bank’s proposal.
It has been argued in the House that the enabling clause will not resolve all the problems, and that a more ambitious stance is called for. I sympathise with these views. The Commission has adopted a similar position in some cases. Nonetheless, if a vote or decision is taken on the basis of the enabling clause, there is no doubt that the Central Bank’s proposal, suitably amended, could prove useful. It would resolve the potential problem of the transition. It is worth remembering that any alternative model would also require unanimity and ratification, and would not be easy to implement."@en1
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