Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-02-12-Speech-3-225"

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"Thank you Mr President, President-in-Office of the Council, and Commissioner, for the essential clarification that you have just given us, which shows the seriousness of the Commission’s work. For once, a technical expert is about to address the House on the subject, in particular, of depleted uranium weapons. It is most important that we do not, whether consciously or not, have any confusion in our minds – either in the minds of the public or, as I have seen in this House, in our own – about the use of depleted uranium weapons and the use of nuclear weapons. On this point you have given us vital information and I simply want to add my own personal testimony. Depleted uranium weapons are weapons which were developed in order to enable new types of armour-plating to be pierced. The armour-plating used in the Second World War was pierced by shells with a hollow charge, powered by chemical energy. New types of armour-plating, however, can only be pierced by weapons powered by kinetic energy. These are known as arrow shells. It is important to be able to give them a high initial speed. They must also have heavy cores. This is why depleted uranium is used. Here I must stress that the confusion which I am talking about is not innocent. I heard on television a journalist who was covering our Members’ visit to Iraq mention enriched uranium in connection with these weapons, and it was mentioned on two occasions, so it could not have been a mere slip of the tongue. I was involved in the research that led to the development of these weapons, in the Terrestrial Weapons Technical Directorate, where we have very powerful unions which protect our workers and our engineers. I am therefore able to tell you that in actual fact, if there had been the slightest risk, the precautionary principle which we observe in the French arms industry would automatically have ruled out such weapons."@en1

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