Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2002-12-05-Speech-4-033"
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"en.20021205.2.4-033"2
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"Mr President, Mr President of the Commission, we have been calling for a Commission proposal to solve the institutional problems that exist. It is at long last before us, and we welcome that. Your paper makes a further interesting and important contribution to the work of the Convention, but it does not provide a total solution for all institutional problems. It does cast some light on the Commission's position regarding a whole raft of issues. For example, majority voting in the Council as a general rule, which we welcome. Majority voting by Parliament on legislation as a general rule, which we also welcome. Bringing justice and home affairs within the Community framework, which is also good, and the creation of a Secretary of the Union for foreign affairs as Vice-President of the Commission with a special relationship with the Council, that is fine, and it represents a workable compromise as a means of solving a difficult problem. And there is much more besides.
I can see many positive points in your proposals. However, in some areas, Mr Prodi, your proposals do not make things clearer – they just create greater confusion. Let me pick out one of them in particular. This is the issue of the appointment and political responsibility of the Commission. You are suggesting that the European Parliament should elect the President of the Commission. That is a good proposal, and a much-needed step forward. But at the same time you say that this President of the Commission must be elected by a two-thirds majority of the European Parliament, which prevents the results of the European elections from being reflected in a decision regarding an appointment at European Union level. In other words it prevents something from happening that is precisely what you want: it prevents voters from deciding who they want as Commission President for the next five years. This means building in a permanent compromise, rather like the permanent grand coalition in Austria. We cannot and we will not go along with that!
The second issue is that the European Council is to confirm the election of the President of the Commission by the European Parliament. How is that to happen? By a majority or unanimously? What do you have in mind? And if the Council does not confirm the President, what then? Does Parliament have the right to dissolve the Council? That is what I would suggest. Your proposals do not include any mechanisms for resolving conflicts. Ultimately, and this really takes the biscuit, the Commission is accountable to both Parliament and the Council. So how will that work out in practice? Will you resign every time? If Parliament says that it has confidence in you, will you stay, and if the Council says you must resign, will you resign? What sort of message does that send about building the institutions of the European Union? It is simply a recipe for confusion! Mr President of the Commission, your proposal in this respect creates more problems than it solves, and the European Parliament regards what you want to tell us is a step forward as actually being two steps back!"@en1
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