Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2002-12-04-Speech-3-057"

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"Mr President, as this debate draws to a close I am pleased to be able to note once again that there is broad agreement between Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the question of enlargement, and that is an important political signal in itself. I would now like to say a brief word on the most important topics of the debate. The problem is, however, that we did not have that option. That option had already been attempted and had already failed and there was no other. I am sure that all the debates of the last few weeks, including those triggered by Mr Giscard d'Estaing, have not achieved the outcome that the former French president wanted. They have resulted precisely in those who would have preferred not to commit themselves at present – and there were quite a number who would have preferred not to do so – now being forced to endorse the outcome of Helsinki once again, namely that Turkey clearly has candidate status, that it will be treated like any other candidate, that its prospects for membership are unqualified and clear and that it is encouraged to continue down that road. That is the outcome of the debate in 15 Member States, so far as the governments are concerned. I am well aware that other views are being taken in public, sometimes even by the majority. But we know that the 15 governments of the Member States are unanimous in the view that we must stick to the Helsinki strategy. In that respect, Mr Giscard d'Estaing’s contribution probably did not have the outcome he wanted. In the debate about dates, I agree with Mr Brok that we must not allow the subject of Turkey to eclipse the decision-making process about ratification in the Member States, and there is probably already a real danger that it will. Regarding the institutional questions, the Commission is of course more than willing to enter into intensive discussions here at any time, and as always the Commission will not have the slightest problem; on the contrary, it will seek to ensure that Parliament’s rights are fully safeguarded. I should just like to make two small points. Naturally, we now needed a working hypothesis for the accessions. Without a date we would have been unable to negotiate the financial chapter, because the date has enormous consequences for the financial situation in the first year of membership. The financial packages for each individual country are quite different, depending on the date taken as a basis for the work. That is why the decision was necessary. So far as I know, it was taken by the Council primarily in the light of the amount of time the Member States said they needed for ratification. That should also be taken into account, as I have often said. So far as the Commission is concerned, I would like to point out once again that it suggested avoiding the transitional Commission with 30 commissioners and therefore offered to cut its term of office short, but it proved impossible to negotiate this. Candidate countries and Member States took the view that the new commissioners must be there from the first day of accession. In that case, I think it is sensible to keep this transitional period with 30 commissioners as short as possible. That is why the date of 1 November emerged for the next Commission. That is the minimum amount of time required to appoint a new Commission President, get him approved and also to give him time to put a new Commission together. That is the full background. I think we can discuss it together sensibly and, as I said, the Commission is willing to do so at any time. First, I will return to the subject of money. I think – no one will be surprised at this – that when we reach the final stage of a negotiating process that involves a lot of money people start to back pedal in public, and those who will have to pay start to say it is too much and those who want something say it is too little. That is quite normal and I would not get too excited about it. There is the structural question, however, which some Members of this House have quite rightly raised, that is: are our rules really designed to allow new members, who are poorer than the European Union’s present average, to gain from their membership in the first few years? That is precisely the problem. Lest anyone should be worrying for nothing, the position as I see it today is this: under the presidency’s proposal, the new Member States will receive more than EUR 9 thousand million net in actual payments in 2004, 2005 and 2006. So when their own contributions are deducted there are EUR 9 thousand million net additional payments left. That means no one is a net payer and they are all in a much better position than in 2003. The figure for appropriations, ladies and gentlemen, is really very impressive, I have to say, and the word meanness is not appropriate. A net EUR 25.7 thousand million in appropriations are available for those three years. That is quite something when you look at the size of these countries’ economies. We should not forget that the gross national product of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe is only five per cent of that of the present European Union. These figures are already reasonably balanced, I should say. It is also true, however, that it repeatedly has to be pointed out by both sides that the European Union is not a cash dispenser. You do not put a card, be it a membership card or a credit card, in at the top and get money out at the bottom. We are not like that at all. We are a community based on law and it is our aim that people should enjoy an equal standard of living, and we help to bring that about, but only in so far as we are actually able. Mrs Schroedter has drawn attention to a particular matter, and unfortunately I have to agree with her, namely that this proposal that rural development funding should be made available for direct payments must actually be regretted from the Union’s point of view. The proposal that we put forward was in fact intended precisely to make possible a socially cushioned, sensible structural development of agriculture in the new Member States. I must however point out that it was quite a strong demand from the candidate countries themselves that they should be able to make a transfer, at least for the first three years. The argument is as simple as it is convincing: without this measure there is no chance of winning the referendum in Poland, for example. That is the background to this decision, but I readily admit that it is certainly regrettable from the point of view of a sensible development of agricultural policy. Now a brief word on the subject of Turkey. Mr Nassauer spoke to me about it in person. I have nothing different to say about it in private than I have said in public. What was quoted in the newspaper I have said many times, including here in the European Parliament. If, in 1999, we had had the opportunity to develop a Turkish strategy without the 40 years of past history we already had, it would never have occurred to me, at any rate, that the correct solution might be to offer Turkey full membership of the European Union."@en1
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