Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2002-11-21-Speech-4-025"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20021121.2.4-025"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:translated text |
".
Madam President, in the short time available, there being two reports to be discussed, I will try to consider a number of different issues.
A detailed discussion on the consequences of these judgments for the Commission’s work would take more time than we have today. I would, however, like to make a few comments.
We are carefully considering the judgments, both in order to decide whether to appeal to the Court of Justice, and in order to take appropriate action for the future. Nevertheless, we should not allow these specific, individual cases to distort our view of the Community merger control policy. As you know, we initiated a vast reform of merger control procedures a long time before these recent rulings. If necessary, it may be appropriate to take advantage of the lessons we have learnt from these judgments in order to put into effect an even more radical reform than that originally planned: this is precisely my intention, as I have already said.
Regardless of whether or not we appeal to the Court of Justice, it is right and proper that the Commission learns as many lessons as possible from certain assessments which have been made and, accordingly, the reform will be even more far-reaching and sweeping. I am, however, keen to specify, quite clearly, that the improvements which we expect to see in the instrument will in no way mean a more lenient policy. We believe that merger control policy – just like competition policy in general – must be fair but, at the same time, strict.
I intend to propose to the College a sweeping reform of the merger control system by the end of December, and I would like to briefly highlight some of its aspects now. The first point concerns the length of investigations. A major advantage of the European system is the short investigation times, as is widely acknowledged. Nevertheless, these short time frames also create some drawbacks which translate, as it were, into a certain tension, at times quite charged, in the final dealings between the parties and the Commission. Therefore, we will not relinquish the benefits derived from these short investigations – which exist in Europe but not in the United States – but we will also propose the introduction of a certain amount of flexibility through a series of provisions to extend certain deadlines.
The other improvements to the decision-making process which I plan to propose include: the formalisation and extension of the existing system of cross-checks in all cases which reach second phase investigations; greater transparency, allowing access to the dossier and dialogue between opposing market views at an earlier stage than is currently the case; more human resources in the Competition Directorate-General, both in order to work in a more appropriate fashion with regard to the high standards set by the Court and to improve our economic analysis capabilities.
I would also like to touch briefly on judicial control in the event of company mergers, which I am aware is of great interest to the European Parliament in general and to Mrs Riis-Jørgensen in particular.
Recent judgments have shown that the European courts exert strict, meticulous control over the Commission’s analyses in merger cases. Judicial control, which exists and is strict, should not, however, only be effective in terms of thoroughness, but also in terms of speed. In this respect, there is still substantial room for improvement, in terms of the speed with which judgments are issued. A fast track system has already been introduced, and we sincerely hope that the Court of First Instance will be able to deal more swiftly with and increase the number of fast track cases. The Commission is willing – as we have already stated – firmly to support the granting of further resources which the Court will certainly need to implement these improvements. Furthermore, it may be helpful to consider whether it would be appropriate to have judicial panels
of
experts handling certain categories of cases at first instance or a unit specialised in mergers at the Court of First Instance.
Whatever kind of reform is considered in order to achieve a successful system, it is, in any case, important not to lose sight of the many merits of our administrative system. I must say that, following the publication of the Commission Green Paper, there were very few calls to abandon or make radical changes to the current system.
If forced to choose between our system and the US system, many businesses – several of which are American – have indicated a preference for the European Union’s system during consultations. Moreover, as you know, systems grounded on administrative decisions in this field are certainly not exclusive to the Commission. Indeed, this is the model used at national level, in the majority of Member States, and it reflects European legal traditions.
My proposals will therefore significantly improve the current system: in some fundamental aspects, they will completely transform the present system. My ambition is that what we propose will be the most modern and effective merger control system, and it will improve the European model by incorporating certain aspects of the US model.
First of all, I would like to thank the rapporteurs, Mr Herzog and Mr Lipietz, for their excellent reports. Once again, they both reflect Parliament’s overall support for European competition policy, support which is so important for the Commission and its departments.
As time is short, Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, I will not expand on other important points addressed in the two reports by Mr Lipietz and Mr Herzog. In particular, I am unable to consider one point which I know, however, to be of great interest to the Chairman of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Mrs Randzio-Plath, and that is international cooperation, an area in which considerable progress has been made over the last year.
Allow me to set out the main features of our competition policy in the state aid sector. The Commission has continued its efforts in this sector in order to simplify, modernise and clarify the rules and practices. New regulations and Community guidelines have been drawn up. For example, at the start of this year, new multisectoral regulations were adopted setting out a much clearer body of rules for the assessment of regional state aid for major investment projects. Another important example is the use of block exemptions, which allow Member States to grant aid without the need for prior notification. Block exemptions for small- and medium-sized enterprises and for training have been adopted and, recently, an exemption for state aid for employment too.
With regard to the reduction and adjustment of state aid, the Member States undertook to reduce the level of aid in the Conclusions of the Stockholm and Barcelona European Councils. In effect, we have seen a clear downward trend, but undeniably, the cumulative effect of aid totalling EUR 82 billion is continuing to substantially distort competition in the Union.
I will now, if I may, respond to some of the points raised in Mr Herzog’s report. I firmly believe that the best way to promote overall Community industrial competitiveness is precisely to maintain a firm policy on state aid. state aid policy is criticised at times, in that it is said to be at variance with measures seeking to attain certain Community objectives. In my view, this variance is, in the majority of cases, more imagined than real. The aim of state aid control is to ensure that the positive effects of one particular measure are not counteracted by the distortion in competition which the measure itself creates.
I also endorse the view, expounded in the report, that we need to focus more on assessing the effectiveness and efficacy of aid. This is one aspect of the aid policy for which the Member States are chiefly responsible. They must develop ways to assess aid schemes, whereas the Commission, for its part, intends to help this process by providing a forum where experiences can be shared.
As regards competition law, our activities have been characterised by our debate on the Commission proposal to update its procedural rules. Work being carried out by the Council regarding the Commission proposal – a proposal fully supported by Parliament, which once again, I would thank – is now nearing completion. It is expected that the Council will agree on the text of a new regulation next week. I am sure that we will also see considerable improvements in our procedures with regard to the aspect which Parliament emphasised most in its resolution, that is the fact that European competition rules should be applied in all cases where trade between Member States could be affected.
Updating Regulation 17, ladies and gentlemen, is an example of the permanent culture of reform which the Commission is seeking to encourage within the institution and which – as we shall soon see – also applies to mergers. I would like to point out, moreover, that as regards updating competition rules, it was the Commission, three years ago, which took the initiative. You will also recall that it was not all that easy, at the start, to persuade the Member States that it would be in the interest of better European governance to have more decentralisation in this respect.
As regards mergers, the number and complexity of cases which reach second phase investigations has increased rapidly. In 2001, the Commission issued five prohibition decisions. Even though this is the highest number of prohibition decisions issued in a single year, this figure continues to represent only around 1.5% of all final decisions. In this connection, it probably will not have escaped your attention that, in October, the Court of First Instance overturned two of these prohibition decisions, in the Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Sidel cases, and there was also the judgment in the Airtours/First Choice case, already referred to in your report."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples