Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2002-11-20-Speech-3-288"
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"en.20021120.8.3-288"2
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"Mr President, Commissioner, I should like to express my appreciation of the work Mrs van den Burg has done on a subject – prudential supervision – that is as vast and complex as its boundaries are ill-defined, especially in relation to an emerging, if only imaginary for the time being, European supervision. Of course, the cases mentioned most often in the report – Enron and WorldCom, and Vivendi and others in other respects – force us to reflect on the effectiveness of the systems that protect the interests of savers and, in more general terms, market operators, not least in order to satisfy the interest of European consumers, users and investors.
I think it timely that the report points out that there is no evidence that Europe is immune to such dramatic crises. It is good there has been an Enron scandal, not so much because of the new laws that have resulted and will result from it, but because the scandal has made investors and pension funds more aware of the need for supervision.
Before we condemn the American system, we must first remember that the overall fall on the Dow Jones index this year has been 16%, while in the euro area the stock exchange indexes have recorded a fall of 34%. Savers have seen a far greater value knocked off their savings in Europe, therefore, than has happened in this
for the United States – and in Germany there has been a fall of up to 40%.
Just as much prudence is needed, I believe (and the report gives a very well-balanced definition in this regard) when citing new rules as a panacea for the ills or difficulties that the markets may encounter, especially if public control is mentioned.
I shall conclude by mentioning a more specific point concerning the integration of the financial markets. I think keeping prudential and credit supervision at a national level, that is in the central banks, is more and more questionable, especially when – as is the case in Italy – the same institution, the central bank, not only deals with prudential supervision but also takes on antitrust functions in the credit market, thus creating a conflict of interests that does not encourage market efficiency."@en1
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