Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2002-11-06-Speech-3-151"
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"en.20021106.10.3-151"2
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".
Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, we were all alarmed and dismayed to learn, three weeks ago, that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was developing a secret programme to enrich uranium for military purposes. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made this admission during a visit to Pyongyang by a delegation from the United States.
With this in mind, the European Union is currently consulting its main partners, namely the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan. The consultations aim to establish the most effective course of action in pursuit of the overall aim which is quite simply to prevent nuclear proliferation and to ensure that North Korea does not come into possession of weapons of this nature.
As long as those other countries providing substantially greater financial support to the KEDO programme continue to weigh up their options, it seems to me quite clear that the European Union should not adopt a definitive position on the future of this programme.
We therefore believe we must take concerted action along with our friends and allies. Together, we should aim to persuade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to honour its undertakings regarding nuclear non-proliferation.
This is the approach we should adopt. At the same time, however, we must ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspectors in Pyongyang are able to continue their monitoring duties.
Ladies and gentlemen, I regret I am currently unable to provide further information. Nonetheless, I should like to emphasise once again that we must give priority to achieving our common aim and maintaining a coordinated approach along with the other participants in the KEDO programme.
This programme is a flagrant violation of the commitments entered into by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under four different international agreements on nuclear energy. The so-called 1994 framework agreement was one of them.
The Presidency has already voiced the European Union’s disquiet. The Union expressed its deep concern in a statement on 18 October 2002. The Union also urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to honour its international commitments on non-proliferation, to freeze its nuclear weapons programme, and to invite verification.
The statement emphasised that North Korea’s failure to honour its commitments put the KEDO programme in jeopardy. In addition, the Union expressed the hope that the peace process in the Korean peninsula would not be adversely affected.
The statement ended by reiterating the European Union’s commitment to cooperate with all the interested parties in the search for a peaceful solution. I should point out that similar messages were conveyed to the Deputy Foreign Minister. The latter met with Commission officials the very day after the news broke.
It should be borne in mind that, through Euratom, the European Union has contributed a total of EUR 75 million over the first five years of the KEDO programme. The programme was set up and implemented between 1996 and 2000. The Union is also committed to annual payments of EUR 20 million between 2001 and 2005.
To put these sums into perspective, I would like to remind you that the Republic of Korea’s contribution amounts to over three thousand million United States dollars. Japan’s contribution, however, is approximately one thousand. As for the United States, to date it has provided financial support worth four hundred million dollars.
I would like to remind you too, that the framework agreement has been the subject of criticism in certain circles in the United States and by the North Koreans themselves. Nonetheless, the aim of freezing the production of plutonium in Pyongyang had been achieved. We must not forget that had that not been the case, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would quite simply have obtained enough plutonium to manufacture dozens of nuclear bombs.
A new threat to the security of the region has emerged as a result of these recent revelations on a uranium enrichment programme for military purposes. This is perceived as a threat to security even though uranium enrichment is in all probability a slower and more difficult method of obtaining material suitable for military purposes than resorting to plutonium that could be produced in Pyongyang. Both parties agree that any new agreement must be reached through diplomatic channels."@en1
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